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Articles
THE STUART ROME LECTURE
KNOCKING AGAINST THE ROCKS: EVALUATING
INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN BOY
THERESA GLENNON, J.D.*
A Frisky Child Knocks His Face Against the Rocks.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The media portrays young black men as dangerous, hostile and
out of control.2 While many African American boys do succeed, statis-
tics about black youth reveal serious achievement gaps between them
and their Caucasian counterparts in school and high rates of arrest
and referral to juvenile court.' Research often focuses on family and
cultural "deficits," looking to blame higher rates of single-parent
households, poverty and an oppositional peer culture for these deeply
troubling statistics.4
The statistics presented in this article show that some of the same
social institutions charged with nurturing children actually divert
many African American boys from paths to successful development.5
Instead, these institutions label, discipline, segregate, punish, and
* Associate Professor of Law, James E. Beasley School of Law at Temple University. I
am grateful to Dean Karen Rothenberg, the Law & Health Care Program, and the Journal
of Health Care Law & Policy for the honor of inviting me back to present the Stuart Rome
Lecture, and to Diane Hoffmann and Susan Leviton for arranging my visit and the terrific
conference. I am indebted to Kathyanne Cohen for her substantial work in the research
and development of this article, to Bill Spearing for his research assistance, and to Barbara
Bezdek and Daniel Losen for their helpful comments on my draft. I especially appreciated
the warm response and thought-provoking comments from the participants at the confer-
ence, many of whom remain important colleagues and friends to me.
1. AsHLEY BRYAN, THE NIGHT HAS EARS: AFRICAN PROVERBS (1999).
2. Eileen Poe-Yamagata & Michael A. Jones, And Justice for Some 6, http://www.build-
ingsblocksforyouth.org/justiceforsome/jfs/pdf (last modified 1999) (on file with the Jour-
nal of Health Care Law & Policy).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See, e.g., Jennifer Sable, The Educational Progress of Black Students, in NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, CONDITION OF EDUCATION 1998, http://www.nces.ed.
gov/pubs98/condition98/c98003.html (visited Aug. 16, 2001) (on file with the Journal of
Health Care Law & Policy).
5. See discussion infra Part II.
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confine them.6 Too often, they crush the souls of black boys. This
article explores the statistics available to confirm the negative treat-
ment that African American boys encounter in our educational,
mental health and juvenile justice systems.' The data collected here
supports three main conclusions. First, African American boys are
much more likely to be identified as disabled or delinquent than
other children, including African American girls. Second, they are
more likely than other children to be placed in educational, mental
health, and juvenile justice programs that exert greater external con-
trol and deliver fewer services despite identified needs. Third, these
negative experiences lead African American boys to stay away from or
exit these institutional settings. These statistics are stark and dis-
turbing. Unexplained by family structure, poverty, or culture,8 they
reveal widespread institutional and personal racism.9
I chose to become a lawyer in the belief that law can be an instru-
ment for progressive social change. Unfortunately, the hopeful era of
civil rights litigation, initiated by the NAACP and culminating in
Brown v. Board of Education,1° is over." By now,judicial protection of a
still separate and unequal status quo through doctrinal developments
under the Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
clear.1 2 Scholars have documented the deepening divide between ra-
cial inequality and formalist interpretations of civil rights law that
largely help white people protect entrenched advantages.1 3 Recent
analyses of civil rights laws such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 are apt to focus on their limitations rather than their promise.
14
Work for racial equality, however, cannot stop.
Ideally, the racial disparities documented here would, on their
own, spur educators, mental health professionals and juvenile justice
officials to act affirmatively to evaluate and change the intertwining
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See discussion infta Part II.
9. See discussion infra Parts II & III.
10. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
11. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Conversion Dilemma,
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY- THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 20, 23-24
(Kimberly Crenshaw et al., eds. 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY].
12. See, e.g., Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimina-
tion Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
13. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw (2d ed. 1980).
14. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF
TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1995); see PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (2000) (providing a far-reaching analysis on the limi-
tations of the law).
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conditions of structural and unconscious racism that so negatively af-
fect African American boys.' 5 However, given the ongoing and un-
changing nature of these disparities, it appears necessary that our laws
prohibiting racial discrimination be used as tools to force officials to
change their institutional practices. Law invariably expresses our soci-
etal values. 16 Thus, a turn to the legal system can be effective through
the force ofjudicial decrees, and by the creation of social norms that
value racial equality.17 While too often antidiscrimination law has
been used to "create [ ] the illusion that racism is no longer responsi-
ble for the condition of the black underclass,"'" legal challenges to
racial inequalities remain one part of the "multi-dimensional ground-
work" in the work for racial equality.'"
For the programs examined in this article, the most promising
legal avenue involves the federal regulations developed to enforce Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20 These regulations prohibit
recipients of federal funds from engaging in policies and practices
that have a racially disparate impact on African American boys and
other minority children." However, the right of private plaintiffs to
seek redress under the Title VI regulations is under siege. A recent
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court restricted access to the courts to
enforce the regulations.22 Lower federal court decisions in some juris-
dictions have gone even further, completely eliminating private par-
ties' access to judicial relief for violations of the Title VI disparate
impact regulations.23 These regulations are vitally important to ad-
15. Professor Sharon Rush has written eloquently about the proactive steps that can be
taken to achieve a greater degree of racial equality. See Sharon E. Rush, Sharing Space: Why
Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 CONN. L. Rsv. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Rush, Sharing Space];
Sharon E. Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SocIAL
CHANGE 1 (1997) [hereinafter Rush, Heart of Equal Protection].
16. See Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 431, 488 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITIcAL RACE THEORY, supra note 11, at 103,
Ill.
18. Id. at 117.
19. Donald E. Lively, Reformist Myopia and the Imperative Progress: Lessons for the Post-Brown
Era, 46 VAND. L. REv. 865, 896 (1993).
20. 34 C.F.R. Part 100 (2001).
21. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2).
22. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that there is no pri-
vate right of action to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations); see also infra Part III.
(providing a discussion of the Sandoval decision).
23. South Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 274 F.3d 771,
788 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that Title VI regulations are not enforceable under § 1983);
Bonnie L. v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (also holding that Title VI
regulations are not enforceable under § 1983). But see, Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., 160 F.
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dressing racial discrimination by our publicly funded institutions, in-
stitutions that hold great power in the lives of our youth. Advocates
must therefore challenge judicial restrictions and demand that Con-
gress keep open this vital avenue for protecting civil rights.
The analysis in this article supports the importance of maintain-
ing access to the courts to challenge policies and practices that nega-
tively affect African American boys and other minority children. This
article re-evaluates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,24 and in particular
its implementing regulations,25 to explore its promise as an effective
tool to require the social institutions of childhood to effectively edu-
cate and aid African American boys. After documenting the dramatic
disparities in the treatment of African American boys, this article ex-
amines doctrinal developments in the contexts of disability, language,
minority and gender discrimination to suggest that a more vigorous
approach to Title VI can help protect African American boys from the
pervasive discrimination they face in our social institutions.2 6 Advo-
cates have been breathing new life into Title VI by using it to attack
structural racism in the form of school funding.27 I suggest that advo-
cates also focus on the biased practices within schools, mental health
and juvenile justice programs that further unconscious racism, and
challenge the interrelated practices of structural and unconscious ra-
cism. Advocates must work both to ensure access to the courts to chal-
lenge policies and practices that have a racially disparate impact on
minorities and to ensure that private litigants effectively employ the
disparate impact regulations to diminish the harsh disparities de-
scribed here.
Finally, this article outlines more recent legislation that responds
to the striking disadvantages black youth experience in our education,
mental health and juvenile justice systems and suggests using those
provisions to advocate change in institutional practices as well as plac-
ing more such requirements into law through legislative advocacy.
28
Supp. 2d 767, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that Title VI regulations are enforceable
under § 1983).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
25. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. Part 100.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. N.Y., 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
28. See infta Part IV.
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II. STATISTICAL DATA
A. Education: Deflecting African American Boys from Avenues to Success
The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United
States that a high-quality education for all individuals and a
fair and equal opportunity to obtain that education are a so-
cietal good, are a moral imperative, and improve the life of
every individual, because the quality of our individual lives
ultimately depends on the quality of the lives of others.29
Despite the Nation's rhetorical commitment to an equal opportu-
nity to obtain a high-quality education, the evidence overwhelmingly
shows that our Nation's schools fail to meet this "moral imperative."
This failure is especially evident in the treatment of African American
boys in U.S. public schools. While African American boys constitute
8.7 percent of the public school population in the United States,3 °
they are greatly underrepresented in those categories that define
school success and grossly overrepresented in those categories that
demonstrate problems in the school environment.
Public schools have failed to close longstanding gaps in achieve-
ment based on race, ethnicity and gender.3 1 Even where the effects of
income are limited, achievement test gaps between white and black
males remain. For example, in Maryland, white boys in the fifth grade
achieve satisfactory performance on the Maryland School Perform-
ance Assessment Program at almost twice the rate of their African
American peers.32 In New York, a detailed statistical analysis of stu-
dent achievement demonstrated that racial achievement gaps re-
mained even when the data was controlled for income level.33
29. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (a)(1) (1994).
30. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, 1998 ELEMENTARY AND SECON-
DARY SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLIANCE REPORT: PROJECTED VALUES FOR THE NATION 1
(1998) (available by request from the Office for Civil Rights, data on file with author)
[hereinafter 1998 OCR DATA].
31. See, e.g., JAY R. CAMPBELL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, NAEP 1999 TRENDS IN
ACADEMIC PROGRESS: THREE DECADES OF STUDENT PERFORMANCE 31-40 (2000).
32. ACHIEVEMENT INITIATIVE FOR MARYLAND'S MINORITY STUDENTS (AIMMS) STEERING
COMMITTEE, MARYLAND STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, MINORITY ACHIEVEMENT IN MARY-
LAND AT THE MILLENNIUM: A SPECIAL REPORT 52-54 (January 2001) [hereinafter MD MINOR-
ITY ACHIEVEMENT].
33. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. N.Y., 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 491 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
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TABLE 1: SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE ON MSPAP BY SUBJECT AND
INCOME, GRADE 5 19993
4
FARMS READING MATH SCIENCE
White Males Yes 30.7 32.8 30.9
No 51.1 55 52.2
Black Males Yes 15.2 14.1 14.4
No 28.5 25.5 28.1
Other indicators of achievement are equally troubling: African
American boys are only half as likely as their white male peers to be
placed in Gifted and Talented Programs and more than a third less
likely to be in Advanced Placement Math and Science Courses.3 5
While the high school graduation rate of African American males has
risen over the past thirty years, it continues to lag behind white
males.3 6 Black males are also underrepresented in college.3" These
racial disparities in educational attainment are demonstrated in the
table below:
TABLE 2: ENROLLMENT STATUS BY RACE AND GENDER, 1998
(% oF 18-21 YEAR OLD POPULATION) 38
Not High
Enrolled in High School Enrolled in School
High School Graduate College Graduate
Total 8.9 76.7 45 14.3
Black Male 18.3 59.6 32 22
White Male 9.0 75.1 42 15.9
While many traditional explanations for the lack of academic
achievement of African American students focus on higher rates of
34. MD MINORITY ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 32. The acronym FARMS refers to the
"Federal Free and Reduced Meal Service" program. Id. at 59.
35. 1998 OCR DATA, supra note 30, at 1.
36. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS
2000, at 125 (2001).
37. Id. at 243. While black males made up 8.7% of the public school population, they
only comprised 5.5% of college attendees in October 1999. White males, who made up
32.3% of the public school population, comprised 34.5% of those attending college in
October 1999. Interestingly, women of all races outnumbered their male peers in college
attendance in the fall of 1999 among white, black and Hispanic American groups (Asian
American students were not included in the data). This gender difference was especially
marked for black students, among whom males comprised 5.5% of the college population
and females comprised 7.4%. African American students of both genders, however, were
underrepresented in college attendance. Id.
38. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 181 (2000).
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poverty and lower levels of parental involvement in education as fac-
tors,39 other studies point to culprits within some schools that are well
within public control, including funding inequities and overburdened
urban school districts, lack of teacher accountability, school staffing,
teachers' reduced expectations and lack of cultural competence, and
concentrated poverty.4" Schools operated by the Department of De-
fense, which face their own substantial barriers to student achieve-
ment, such as low income and high mobility, have succeeded in
halving the racial achievement gap found in civilian schools, and
point the way toward increasing the achievement of students of
color.4" Even issues such as an "oppositional peer culture" have
proven amenable to concentrated efforts to change school culture:4 2
Studies of ability grouping practices in public schools, while less
comprehensive, demonstrate the same troubling pattern. "Ability
grouping" describes a wide range of programs, including within class
groupings for specific subjects, such as math or reading, to much
more rigid between-class assignments which greatly diminish the level
of interaction among students at different levels.43 Assignments to dif-
ferent "tracks" may be based on test scores, grade point averages,
teacher recommendations and parent requests.44 While ability-group-
ing practices are widespread, they are rarely formalized in school dis-
trict policy statements, and students and parents may not be informed
of tracking practices in their school.45
Evidence that ability-grouping programs harm students placed in
lower tracks is substantial.46 Studies show that ability grouping, inde-
39. See, e.g., Sable, supra note 4 (discussing significant differences between white and
black student achievement with a focus on "family characteristics" and not even mention-
ing the characteristics of the schools they attend).
40. MD MINORITY ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 32, at 3-12.
41. Debra Viadero, Minority Gaps Smaller in Some Pentagon Schools, EDUCATION WEEK
(March 29, 2000), http://www.edweek.org/ (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law &
Policy).
42. Debra Viadero & Robert Johnston, Lifting Minority Achievement: Complex Answers, ED-
UCATION WEEK (April 5, 2000), http://www.edweek.org/ (on file with the Journal of
Health Care Law & Policy).
43. JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY 43-60 (1985)
(describing the varied patterns of tracking programs found at the twenty-five schools
studied).
44. Daniel Losen, Silent Segregation in Our Nation's Schools, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
517, 519-20 (1999).
45. OAKES, supra note 43, at 44.
46. See, e.g., id. at 8-9, 93-112; Robert E. Slavin, Achievement Effects of Ability Grouping in
Secondary Schools: A Best-Evidence Synthesis, 60 REv. OF EDUC. Rxs. 471 (1990); HUGH MEHAN
ET AL., CONSTRUCTING SCHOOL SUCCESS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNTRACKING Low-ACHIEV-
ING STUDENTS 5-10 (1996).
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pendent of student background and achievement, affects student edu-
cational aspirations.47  High ability-group placement leads to
aspirations for college attendance, while low placement leads to a lack
of aspiration to attend college.48 Ability grouping choices made early
in a child's educational career may later rule out enrollment in more
challenging college preparatory courses in higher grades.49 A model
detracking program demonstrated substantial gains in college attend-
ance by African American students who had participated.5 ° In addi-
tion, studies have shown substantial academic gains by students of
color who have been taught in cooperative learning environments
rather than ability grouping programs.51
Because of the differences in ability grouping programs, there
are no national data available on the racial and gender effects of abil-
ity grouping programs.5 2 However, the more limited studies that have
been conducted reveal that ability grouping programs place students
of color in the lower tracks at very high rates and lead to significant
racial segregation within otherwise integrated schools.53 Given the
other educational data available about African American boys, it is
probable that they are even more likely than African American girls to
wind up in low achievement-oriented, highly segregative educational
settings.54
African American male students are also grossly overrepresented
in special education, which is often viewed as "below" the lowest regu-
47. Jomills Braddock, II & Marvin Dawkins, Ability Grouping, Aspirations, and Attain-
ments: Evidence from the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988, J. NEGRO EDUC. 324,
329-30 (1993).
48. Id.
49. Losen, supra note 44, at 519-20.
50. MEHAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 45-46.
51. Id. at 13.
52. For example, ability grouping programs are not included in the biennial collection
of data by race, ethnicity and gender by the Office for Civil Rights. See, e.g., 1998 OCR
DATA, supra note 30.
53. Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality and Access to Knowledge, in HANDBOOK OF RE-
SEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 465, 474 James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee
Banks eds., 1995); ANNE WHEELOCK, CROSSING THE TRACKS, How UNTRACKING CAN SAVE
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 9 (1992); KENNETH J. MEIER ET AL., RACE, CLASS, AND EDUCATION, THE
POLITICS OF SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATION 3 (1989); OAKES, supra note 43, at 66-67
(describing the disproportionate representation of minority students in the lower tracks at
six racially mixed schools); see, Angela Dickens, Note, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education:
How Tracking has Resegregated America's Public Schools, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 469
(1995-1996) (providing an overview of the research on the negative effects of tracking pro-
grams on minority students and the segregative effects of such programs).
54. Given the negative impact of placement in the lower tracks of ability grouping pro-
grams, it is urgent that the United States Department of Education begin to measure the
racial, ethnic and gender effects of ability grouping programs.
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lar academic track. They are particularly disproportionately repre-
sented in the categories of mental retardation, serious emotional
disturbance, and specific learning disabilities.55 Overrepresentation
in these categories has been longstanding.56 The Office for Civil
Rights has focused on these three categories because they are more
open to subjective decision making.5" Sharp variations among the
states in identification rates of children in these different categories
demonstrate the subjectivity of these determinations. For example,
black youth are identified as having mental retardation at more than
four times the rate of white students in states as diverse as Connecti-
cut, Mississippi, North Carolina, Nebraska, and South Carolina, while
they are overrepresented at a rate of less than two times in California,
Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Utah and West
Virginia.5"
Overrepresentation rates also varied widely among different disa-
bilities within the same states. 59 For example, in Indiana, black stu-
dents are 3.31 times more likely than white students to be identified as
having mental retardation, 1.78 times as likely to be identified as hav-
ing an emotional disability, but slightly less likely than white students
to be identified as having a specific learning disability.6 ° In Utah,
black students are 1.75 times more likely than white students to be
identified as having mental retardation, 3.73 times more likely to be
identified as having emotional disabilities, and 2.25 times as likely to
be identified as having a specific learning disability.6'
Lower socio-economic status appears to place children at risk for
somewhat higher rates of disability.62 It is often difficult to separate
55. 1998 OCR DATA, supra note 30, at 1.
56. See Theresa Glennon, Race, Education and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995
Wis. L. REv. 1237, 1250-58.
57. See Beth Harry & Mary G. Anderson, The Social Construction of High-Incidence Disabili-
ties: The Effect on African American Males, in AFICAN AMERICAN MALES IN SCHOOL AND SOCI-
ETW: POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR EFECrTvE EDUCATION 34, 37-41 (Vernon C. Polite &James
Earl Davis eds.1999) [hereinafter Harry & Anderson, Social Construction].
58. Tom Parrish, Disparities in the Identification, Funding and Provision of Special Education,
in THE CIL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE CONFERENCE ON MINORITY ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Tables 1 & 2, http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/conferences/
SpecEd/parrishpaper2.html (Nov. 6, 2000) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law &
Policy).
59. Id.
60. Id. at Table 2.
61. Id.
62. Donald P. Oswald et al., Community and School Predictors of Over Representation of Mi-
nority Children in Special Education, in THE CIL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE CONFERENCE ON MI-
NORITY ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 11, http://www.law.harvard.edu/
civilrights/conferences/SpecEd/oswald.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2001) (on file with the
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the effects of poverty from race because, in the United States, poverty
and race are correlated.6 3 However, when closely scrutinized by com-
munity, rates of African American boys identified as having mental
retardation actually rose in higher income communities and in com-
munities with few nonwhite students.64 A study conducted in Atlanta
found that race appeared to be a strong factor in identification as
having mild mental retardation for African American children in
higher economic brackets and whose mothers had higher levels of ed-
ucation." In addition, at the national level, the disproportions vary
greatly by type of disability with African American males most over-
represented in the serious emotional disturbance category and far less
disproportionately represented in the category of specific learning dis-
ability.66 These data strongly indicate systemic bias.67 Congress recog-
nized the severity of the disproportionate representation of minority
students in special education in the passage of the 1997 Amendments
to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, noting, "greater ef-
forts are needed to prevent the intensification of problems connected
with mislabeling . . .among minority children with disabilities."68
Other studies point to a variety of factors that contribute to the
disproportionate placement of African American boys in special edu-
cation. These factors include issues concerning teacher readiness:
lack of teacher preparation for working with diverse learners, gender
and cultural gaps between a predominantly white female teaching
staff and black boys, the 'devaluing of the patterns of language learn-
ing and usage of African American boys, sharply contrasting cultural
Journal of Health Care Law and Policy) (finding that data supports that greater susceptibil-
ity to serious emotional disturbance and specific learning disabilities is related to greater
levels of poverty).
63. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 11-20-11-22
(1998).
64. Id. An analysis conducted by U.S. News & World Report also found that black
students are most likely to be overrepresented in special education classes when they are
students in predominantly white school districts, and that in some school districts, neither
the number of black students nor household demographics accounted for the high per-
centage of black students. Joseph P. Shapiro et al., Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Dec. 13, 1993, at 46, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/
93edl.htm.
65. Marshalyn Yeargin-Allsop et al., Mild Mental Retardation in Black and White Children
in Metropolitan Atlanta: A Case-Control Study, 85 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 324, 326 (1995).
66. 1998 OCR DATA, supra note 30, at 1.
67. Id. at 11-14.
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (8) (A) (1999).
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preferences for physical and verbal behavior, and inappropriate use of
specific instructional strategies. 69
When the special education identification and placement figures
are broken out by race and gender, a stark picture appears. Using
white female students as the baseline, African American boys are the
most overrepresented by very significant degrees in the categories of
mental retardation and serious emotional disturbance. The race and
gender disparities are striking: while African American females are
2.02 times as likely as white females to be identified as mentally re-
tarded, African American males are 3.26 times as likely."v African
American girls are 1.4 times as likely as white females to be identified
as having serious emotional disturbance, while African American boys
are a remarkable 5.5 times as likely to be identified.71
These data are especially disturbing because special education
programs have failed to achieve significant educational improvement
for African American students identified as having disabilities.7 2 In
addition, identification as disabled often leads to the exclusion of stu-
dents from the general education curriculum. 73
While the federal government has failed to collect data concern-
ing restrictiveness of educational placement by race and gender,
smaller studies and litigation demonstrate that African American
males, once identified, are even more likely than other special educa-
tion students to be placed in separate classes or separate schools
which exert greater external controls over them.7 ' An examination of
California statistics reveals that African American students identified
as disabled were less likely than white students to be placed in general
education classes or resource rooms and much more likely than white
students to be placed in full-time, self-contained special education
classes and fulltime private school placements. 75 Despite being placed
in more restrictive settings and being identified as needing intensive
69. See Beth Harry & Mary G. Anderson, The Disproportionate Placement of African Ameri-
can Males in Special Education Programs: A Critique of the Process, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 602, 610-
11 (1994) [hereinafter Harry & Anderson, Disproportionate Placement].
70. Donald P. Oswald et al., supra note 62, at 19.
71. Id.
72. See Harry & Anderson, Social Construction, supra note 57.
73. Harry & Anderson, Disproportionate Placement, supra note 69, at 602.
74. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 56, at 1255.
75. See Parrish, supra note 58, at 16 (providing statistics based on the California Special
Education Management Information System (CASEMIS)). The most striking statistic is
that while 24% of white students are in self-contained classrooms, 37% of African Ameri-
can students are placed in similar classrooms. Id. at 14.
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services in higher percentages, African American students in Califor-
nia actually received significantly lower levels of services than white students.76
TABLE 3: PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS
BY RACE IN CALIFORNIA
7 7
Mainstream
% of Needing with Special
Students in Intensive Related Resource Education Private
Special Ed Services Mainstream Services Room Self-Contained School
White 23 68 27 46 24 2
Black 29 57 17 41 37 4
The high level of segregation from nondisabled students and
from the regular academic curriculum harms students labeled as dis-
abled. 78 Segregated classes are not likely to provide a more appropri-
ate education. For example, the classrooms in which students with
emotional disabilities are placed tend to rely on teacher-controlled be-
havior management programs.79 These programs focus on external
controls, with a set system of rewards and punishments for certain be-
haviors, rather than encouraging students to learn to use their own
strengths to develop improved social skills.8 0 Thus, misidentification
and misuse of restrictive placements harm children.
The data concerning the disproportionate use of school disci-
pline are equally disturbing. African American boys receive corporal
punishment at three times their percentage of the school population;
out-of-school suspensions at 2.5 times their percentage of the popula-
tion; and expulsions at more than three times their presence in the
school population. 1
Research shows that African American males are much more
likely to be seen as having propensities for aggressive behavior.8 2 As a
result, they are sent out of the classroom and subjected to more severe
76. Parrish, supra note 58, at 14.
77. Parrish, supra note 58.
78. See, e.g., Harry & Anderson, Social Construction, supra note 57.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. 1998 OCR DATA, supra note 30, at 1.
82. A study involving students in Pittsburgh showed that while black boys were shown
to have significantly lower levels of psychopathology (depression and aggression) than
white boys, they were more likely to be seen by teachers as having higher levels of delin-
quency and aggression than white boys. Horacio Favrega, Jr. et al., Adolescent Psychopathology
as a Function ofInformant and Risk Status, 184 J. NERvous & MENTAL DxSEASE 27, 32 (1996).
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consequences for less serious conduct and more subjective reasons.83
A recent study carefully examined, and ultimately rejected, two com-
mon explanations for the greater discipline rates for African Ameri-
can males: first, that the disproportion only reflects the greater use of
school discipline with students of lower socioeconomic backgrounds;
and second, that the disproportion reflects greater rates of misbehav-
ior by black male students.8 4 The authors concluded that the data
they studied indicated systemic racial discrimination, largely originat-
ing at the classroom level.8 5
African American boys, finding themselves over identified as dis-
abled, segregated from regular classes or high academic level work,
over-disciplined, and falling behind in achievement rates, exit schools
by dropping out. A study of 18-21 year olds finds that 22 percent of
African-American males did not complete high school.8 6 One study
related this high drop out rate to student perceptions that "the choice
of either staying in school or dropping out may be less of a choice and
more of a natural response to a negative environment [from] which
he [ ] is trying to escape. 87
B. Mental Health Services: Multiple Barriers to Effective Assistance
Racial and ethnic minorities have less access to mental
health services than do whites. They are less likely to receive
needed care. When they receive care, it is more likely to be
poor in quality .... Ethnic and racial minorities do not yet
completely share in the hope afforded by remarkable scien-
tific advances in understanding and treating mental disor-
ders. Because of preventable disparities in mental health
services, a disproportionate number of minorities are not
83. RUSSELL J. SKIBA ET AL., INDIANA EDUCATION POLICY CENTER, THE COLOR OF DiscI-
PLINE: SOURCES OF RACIAL AND GENDER DISPROPORTIONALITY IN SCHOOL PUNISHMENT, POLICY
RESEARCH REPORT #SRS1, at 13, 16 (2000).
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id.; see also Michael Weitzman et al., Black and White Middle Class Children Who Have
Private Health Insurance in the United States, 104 PEDIATRICS 151-157 (1999). (In a study of
white and black middle class students, black students were more than twice as likely to have
been suspended as their white peers.)
86. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 36, at 330.
87. SKIBA ET AL., supra note 83, at 17 (citing D.T. Bullara, Classroom Management Strate-
gies to Reduce Racially-biased Treatment of Students, 4J. EDUC. & PSYCHOL. CONSULTATION, 357-
68 (1993)). African-American males do not often describe their teachers or other school
personnel as the people they would talk to about their life goals or identify them as being
important to achieving their goals. Michael Cunningham, African American Adolescent
Males' Perceptions of Their Community Resources and Constraints: A Longitudinal Analysis, 27 J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 569, 576 (1999).
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fully benefiting from, or contributing to, the opportunities
and prosperity of our society.88
Unlike the public education and juvenile justice systems, the
mental health delivery system is highly fragmented, and services are
provided in a variety of settings through a vast array of both public
and private funding mechanisms. 89 In addition, there is widespread
agreement that the mental health care system serves few well. This
fragmentation has impeded efforts to gather information about the
quality and effectiveness of these services for African-American boys.9 °
The picture that can be pieced together, however, suggests that Afri-
can-American boys are more likely to be referred to these services by
school or other authorities, and they are less likely to receive private
mental health services or to continue with treatment.
A comprehensive review of mental health care studies conducted
by the U.S. Surgeon General revealed that few American children who
are in need of mental health care are able to receive mental health
services.9 The most recent government report on mental health care
indicates that African American children are more likely than white
children to have unmet needs. 92 Researchers estimate that as many as
one in five children or adolescents may have a mental health problem
that can be identified and treated, and that one in ten may have a
more serious mental health problem that requires intervention.93
Only one in five children with a serious emotional problem receive
specialized mental health services,9 4 and almost half of those children
88. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH: CULTURE, RACE, AND
ETHNICITY - A SUPPLEMENT TO MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL 3
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT].
89. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 406-08 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT].
90. See Matthew C. Johnsen et al., Structure and Change in Child Mental Health Service
Delivery Networks, 24J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 275 (1996) (discussing the successes and fail-
ures in the movement to remedy structural fragmentation in the mental health system for
children and adolescents).
91. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL'S
CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA 10, 17 (2000),
available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/cmh/childreport.htm (last visited Aug. 14,
2001) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH].
92. 2001 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 59.
93. Center for Mental Health Services, Mental, Emotional and Behavior Disorders in Chil-
dren and Adolescents, http://www.mentalhealth.org/publications/allpubs/CA-0006/
Medbis2.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2001) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law and
Policy).
94. CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 91, at 11; 2000 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT,
supra note 89, at 180.
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receive specialized care only in school.9 5 Frequently, children and ad-
olescents drop out rather than complete treatment programs. 9
6
The difficulties all children face receiving needed treatment may
well be exacerbated for children of color. Racial inequalities are re-
ported in many health care contexts.97 African Americans receive less
prenatal care, and fewer childhood immunizations, flu shots, and
screenings for cancer than Caucasian Americans.98 Once they enter
the medical care system, they are less likely to receive costly proce-
dures despite their overall poorer health.99 Explanations for these
disparities include lower access to insurance coverage and less ability
to pay privately; physician reluctance to participate in medical assis-
tance programs; geographic maldistribution of health resources and
residential segregation; and lack of trust in and familiarity with medi-
cal resources, which inhibits early intervention and treatment; diffi-
cult cross-cultural patient-physician interactions; and racial
discrimination by health care providers.'00 The Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association stated that its
review of racial disparities in medical treatment led it to conclude that
they "may reflect the existence of subconscious bias."'10 '
Higher rates of poor health among African Americans are mir-
rored in higher rates of mental health problems.102 One important
cause of this higher rate appears to be poverty, which disproportion-
ately affects African American families.103 The reasons for the link
between poverty and mental illness are not well understood, but ex-
perts speculate that it may be partly due to the greater stress that liv-
ing in poverty imposes on individuals.10 4 Some researchers have also
argued that African Americans may suffer from psychological stress
95. See 2000 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 89, at 409.
96. Id. Most of the research on early termination of services has focused on demo-
graphic or diagnostic correlates of early termination; few researchers have directly asked
children or their parents why they discontinued treatment. See Stanley Sue, In Search of
Cultural Competence in Psychotherapy and Counseling, 53 AM. PSYCHOL. 440 (1998).
97. ALVIN F. PouIssAiNT & AMY ALEXANDER, LAY My BURDEN DoWN 65-83 (2000) (re-
viewing historical and current unequal health and mental health care given to African
Americans); David Barton Smith, Addressing Racial Inequities in Health Care: Civil Rights Mon-
itoring and Report Cards, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 75, 75 (1998).
98. Smith, supra note 97, at 75.
99. Id. at 76.
100. Id. at 76-77.
101. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263J.
AM. MED. Assoc. 2344, 2346 (1990).
102. 2000 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 89, at 82, 84.
103. Id.; see also 2001 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 57.
104. Id.; see Marc A. Zimmerman et al., Resilience Among Urban African American Male Ado-
lescents: A Study of the Protective Effects of Sociopolitical Control on Their Mental Health, 27 AM. J.
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associated from living in a pervasively racist society. 10 5 Thus, as a
group, African Americans are thought to have higher rates of mental
illness than Caucasian Americans, but these racial disparities in preva-
lence disappear when income levels are held steady.'0 6
The studies concerning racial disparities in the receipt of mental
health care are inadequate and conflicting. However, several factors
that may affect the mental health care of young black males appear to
be at work. First, African Americans are less likely to receive their
mental health care in private outpatient settings, where they may ex-
perience a greater ability to choose care that is appropriate to their
needs. 10 7 Second, clinician bias is pervasive and affects the quality of
care provided to African Americans.'0° In addition, African American
parents do not view the mental health system as helpful, and they do
not turn to it for assistance as often as white parents do. 109
African Americans are less likely than Caucasian Americans to re-
ceive privately financed mental health care, especially in individual
outpatient practice. 11° They are overrepresented in public inpatient
mental health programs, present at similar rates to other groups in
publicly financed community mental health programs, and greatly un-
PSYCHOL. 733 (1999) (discussing the feeling of helplessness due to the lack of sociopolitical
control and takes on psychological well-being).
105. POUISSANT & ALEXANDER, sup-a note 97, at 95-96, 102-104, 142.
106. Id. at 84.
107. Arthur L. Whaley, Racism in the Provision of Mental Health Services: A Social-Cognitive
Analysis, 68 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHATRY 47, 52 (1998).
108. "Bias in clinician judgment is thought to be reflected in overdiagnosis or misdiag-
nosis of mental disorders." 2000 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 89, at 88. "African-
Americans have fewer mood/anxiety and substance abuse diagnoses but significantly more
organic/psychotic diagnoses. These differences probably reflect ethnocentric clinician bias
in the diagnostic assessment of youth from cultural/racial backgrounds." Mark D. Kilgns
et al., Influence of Race on Diagnosis in Adolescent Psychiatric Inpatients, 34 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
AoLEsc. PSYCHIATRY 67 (1995); see also Carl C. Bell & Harshad Mehta, The Misdiagnosis of
Black Patients with Manic Depressive Illness, 72 NATL. MED. Assoc. 141 (1980).
109. 2001 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 63-65 (noting that the child welfare
system is the "principal gatekeeper for African American mental health care"); see also,
Steven P. Cuffe et al., Race and Gender Differences in the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders in
Young Adolescents, 34 J. AM. AcAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1536 (1995); Mark D.
Kilgus et al., supra note 108, at 70; William P. McMiller et al., Help-Seeking Preceding Mental
Health Clinic Intake among African-American, Latino and Caucasian Youth, 35 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1091, 1092 (1996) (explaining that minority parents are
more likely to first turn to their family, religious leaders, and community). Parents of
different cultural backgrounds may have different criteria for believing that their child has
a serious emotional problem. Id. at 1097. It has been theorized that African American
parents tend to view professional and agency contact as multiplying the risk that their
children will be wrongly labeled, medicated, or hospitalized. Id.
110. See 2000 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 89, at 85.
26 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 5:10
derrepresented in privately financed individual outpatient practice.1 1'
The under representation in private outpatient care persists even
among African Americans with private health insurance, which sug-
gests that socioeconomic levels do not explain the lower rates of utili-
zation of private outpatient treatment."1 2
Few studies of mental health care have focused on children of
color. However, studies of racial differences in mental health care
suggest that clinician bias negatively affects the diagnosis and treat-
ment of African American clients." 3 They tend to receive more seri-
ous diagnoses, be assigned to more junior professionals for
counseling, and receive low-cost, less preferred treatment with mini-
mal contact or medication only." t 4 African American clients are less
likely to be given intensive psychotherapy and more likely to be
treated in more restrictive settings." 5 Research indicates that African
Americans receive less effective treatment.116 This failure seems to be
attributed at least in part to a higher rate of inaccurate diagnosis, as
well as clinician bias." 17
White therapists diagnose identical symptoms differently, de-
pending on the race of the client."' In addition, the severity of the
diagnosed illnesses of African American clients varied by the race of
the psychologist." 9 Specifically, African American clients are more
likely to be misdiagnosed with a severe psychopathology.12 0 Studies
also suggest that white psychologists are more likely to consider black
patients to be violent. 12  Several studies show that white clinicians
spend considerably less time with black patients than with white pa-
111. 2001 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 65; 2000 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT,
supra note 89, at 85. African Americans are least likely to seek help from a therapist in
private practice and are underrepresented in such services, however "African Americans
who have undergone treatment for mental health problems are more likely than whites to
be confined to jails and prisons and mental hospitals and more likely as well to become
homeless". Lonnie R. Snowden, African American Service Use for Mental Health Problems, 27J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 303, 310-311 (1999).
112. 2000 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 89, at 85.
113. Id.
114. Whaley, supra note 107, at 52 (reviewing results of various studies); see also, Charles
R. Ridley et al., Training in Cultural Schemas: An Antidote to Unintentional Racism in Clinical
Practice, 70 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 65, 66 (2000).
115. Whaley, supra note 107, at 52.
116. 2001 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 66-67.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Sue, supra note 96, at 441; see also, Barbara A. Noah, Racial Disparities in the
Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 135, 150 (1998).
120. Whaley, supra note 107, at 51 (basing assertions on a review of the psychiatric
literature).
121. See Sue, supra note 96, at 440-47.
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tients, 1 2 2 and they are likely to view a black male with high scores on
an IQ test as less psychologically equipped to benefit from verbal ther-
apy than a white patient with a far lower IQ test score.123 As a result,
members of minority groups may fear or feel ill at ease with the
mental health system, seeing it as oriented toward a white, middle-
class population. 124 African American clients are more likely to ex-
press dissatisfaction and unfavorable impressions of their treatment
and to terminate that treatment prematurely.1 25
These different experiences may partly explain why African
American parents are more likely to turn to their family, religious
leaders and the community for help with their children's emotional
and behavioral problems, while white families are more apt to seek
out mental health services. 126 African American parents fear that pro-
fessional and agency contact will only increase the likelihood that
their children will be wrongly labeled, medicated, or hospitalized. 127
While African American families are less likely to seek help from
mental health professionals, their male children are more likely to be
referred for treatment by schools, courts and other agencies for treat-
ment in community mental health programs. 12 While African Ameri-
can boys are more likely to be referred for services, they are less likely
to benefit from or continue in services.12 9
122. See id.
123. See id. (citing studies).
124. See id. at 441.
125. See id. at 441-42; Ridley et al., supra note 114, at 66; see also, Khanh-Van T. Bui &
David T. Takeuchi, Ethnic Minority Adolescents and the Use of Community Mental Health Care
Services, 20 AM.J. OF PSYCHOL. 403, 412-15 (1992).
126. A study of parents' first contact point in seeking help for their children showed
that African American parents are more likely to make first contact with "nonprofessional
sources" such as family and community contacts. Conversely, white parents were more
likely to have made their first contact with mental health professionals. McMiller et al.,
supra note 109, at 1087.
127. 2000 MENrAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 89, at 11 ( stating that psychiatrists una-
ware that there are genetic differences among the races in the metabolization rate for
drugs may prescribe pharmacotherapies in dosages that are too high, resulting in uncom-
fortable side effects); see also PouissANr & ALEXANDER, supra note 97, at 77; Regina Bussing
et al., Knowledge and Information about ADHD: Evidence of Cultural Differences Among African-
American and White Parents, 46 Soc. Sci. MED. 919, 926 (1998) (theorizing that one reason
that African American parents are reluctant to seek help for their children's ADHD is a
lack of trust between African Americans and the medical community fostered by a long
history of inequitable treatment).
128. 2000 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 89, at 181.
129. Id. at 181-82; see also, Will Drakeford & Lili Frank Garfinkel, Differential Treatment of
African American Youth, http://www.edjj.org/Publications/pub_06_13_00_2.html (visited
on May 9, 2001) (on file with the journal of Health Care Law and Policy) (claiming that by
inaccurately perceiving African American clients as less distressed than white clients, ther-
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Researchers have come to recognize that they have operated
from a "deficit" model concerning African American boys. 3' The re-
search literature generally ignores the many black boys who function
well in high-risk environments, and they and their families are usually
described in terms of pathology.' This bias may also affect the
mental health treatment provided to African American boys by under-
mining its effectiveness.
C. Juvenile Justice: The Criminalization of African-American Youth
[D]isparate juvenile and criminal justice rates for minorities
are not a new phenomenon. Yet until recently we have not
been sufficiently concerned to ask the important questions:
Why do these rates exist? What can we do about them? How
can we avoid this continued problem in the future? These
questions are not easy ones to ask . ... "'
Risky, illegal behavior is not uncommon among adolescents, nor
is it particular to any racial or ethnic group. A recent household sur-
vey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control shows that, as a per-
centage of their demographic group, white male adolescents were
more likely than black male adolescents to engage in risky and/or
illegal conduct.133 White males were more likely to drive after drink-
ing, carry a weapon, and bring a weapon to school, and they engaged
in physical fights in approximately the same percentages as their black
male peers.
TABLE 4: ILLEGAL AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 199913
Driving After Carried a Weapon at In a Physical
Drinking Weapon School Fight
White 18.7 28.6 11 43.2
Black 10.6 23.1 5.3 44.4
Hispanic 17.2 29.5 12.3 50.5
apists may delay start of therapy, misdiagnose seriousness of potential risk and be influ-
enced when developing treatment formulation.).
130. Edmund W. Gordon, Foreword to VERNON C. POLITE & JAMES EARL DAVIS, AFRICAN
AMERICAN MALES IN SCHooL AND SOCIETY. PRACTICES AND POLICIES FOR EFFECTIVE EDUCA-
TION, at ix (1999); Cunningham, supra note 87, at 571.
131. Gordon, supra note 130, at ix.
132. NATIONAL COALITION OF STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUPS, A REPORT ON
THE DELICATE BALANCE 2 (1989).
133. Laura Kann et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance - United States, 1999, http://
www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss4905al.htm (last modified June 9, 2000)
(on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
134. Id.
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Similarly, with the exception of marijuana use, heavy use of alcohol
and illegal drugs was reported to be far more prevalent among white
male adolescents.
TABLE 5: DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE, 1999135
Heavy
Drinking Marijuana Cocaine Heroin Meth-amphetamine
White 39.1 29.6 11 3.4 10.9
Black 17.4 31.2 2.8 1.6 2.2
Hispanic 37.5 34.8 18.3 3.1 11
Although black males do not disproportionately engage in risky
and illegal conduct, they are disproportionately subject to arrest. 136
Police decisions to arrest an individual are often discretionary. With
the exclusion of serious crimes, police who observe illegal behavior
may simply give a warning or make an arrest.1 37 While media atten-
tion has been drawn to racial disparities in traffic stops, recent juve-
nile arrest data demonstrate racial disparities in almost every offense
category, indicating that such disparities are not limited to car
stops. 13
8
TABLE 6: JUVENILE ARREST OFFENSES
139
Percent Of Total Arrests
Most Serious Offense Estimated Number of
Charge Juvenile Arrests White African American
Total Arrests 2,603,300 71 26
Violent Crime 112,200 55 42
Property Crime 596,100 70 25
Vandalism 126,800 80 17
Weapons Violation 45,200 66 32
Drug Abuse Violations 205,800 66 32
Disorderly Conduct 183,700 67 32
Curfew and Loitering
Law Violations 187,800 71 27
Runaways 165,100 78 18
135. Id.
136. OFFICE OF JUVENILE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE ARRESTS 4 (1999).
137. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 2, at 6.
138. Madeline Wordes & Timothy Bynum, Policing Juveniles - Is There Bias Against Youths
of Color?, in MINORITIES IN JUVENILEJUSTICE (Kimberly Kempf Leonard et al. eds., 1995); see
also Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 2, at 7-9, 11.
139. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 136, at 4.
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TABLE 7: JUVENILE JUSTICE OVERVIEW, 1997140
% White/Hispanic Black
Population 79 15
Arrested 71 26
Referred 66 31
Detained Pretrial 53 44
Formally Processed 63 34
Waived to Adult Court 50 46
Adjudicated Delinquent 64 32
Placed on Probation 66 31
Residential Placement 60 36
Once arrested, African American youth are "cumulatively disad-
vantaged.1 4 1 As illustrated in the table above, at every stage in the
process, racial disproportionalities fall more harshly on African Ameri-
can adolescents.1 4 2 Once a youth is arrested, either juvenile proba-
tion or a prosecutor's office determines whether to dismiss the case,
handle it informally, or refer the case for formal intervention by the
juvenile court. 14  While black youth were 26% of juveniles arrested,
they were 31% of those referred for formal processing in juvenile
court.1 4 4 White youth, however, who constituted 71% of those ar-
rested, were only 66% of those referred for formal processing.1 45
Thus, white youth were far more likely to have their arrests dealt with
informally. At the next stage, when a determination is made whether
to follow through with a referral for formal processing, African Ameri-
can youth are once again treated more harshly.1 4 6 In particular, Afri-
can American youth are far more likely to have formal petitions filed
against them for drug offenses. 147 African American youth are also far
more likely to be held in pretrial detention. 14' As illustrated in the
140. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 2, at 8-17.
141. Id. at 4.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 8.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 10-11.
147. In 1997, 78% of drug offense cases involving African American youth were formally
processed, while only 56% of drug offense cases involving white youth were formally
processed. Id at 11; see also, Wordes & Bynum supra note 139 .
148. "In Maryland, although African Americans make up only 17 percent of the youth
population, they account for 39 percent of arrests and a staggering 64 percent of the over
7000 annual admissions to state detention facilities. Indeed 81 percent of the youth in the
state's largest juvenile detention institution, the Cheltenham Youth Facility, are African
American." Stacey Gurian-Sherman, Back to the Future: Returning Treatment to Juvenile Justice,
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above table, of the white youth referred to juvenile court, a smaller
percentage were held in detention facilities, while a larger percentage
of the African American youth referred to juvenile court were de-
tained.149 Black youth were more than twice as likely to be detained
for a drug offense than white youth. 150 Once adjudicated delinquent,
white youth are much more likely to receive probation than black
youth. While more white youth adjudicated delinquent are placed on
probation than placed in custody, these figures are reversed for Afri-
can American youth, who are more likely to receive a disposition of
custody than to receive probation."'
The same pattern of racial disproportionality appears in the deci-
sions to waive youth to adult court for prosecution. While only about
1% of petitioned cases are waived to adult court, African American
youth are much more likely than white youth to be waived to criminal
court even when charged with the same offense.'52 The racial dispari-
ties in waivers to adult court varied widely among the states. While
overall minority youth were waived at 2.8 times their presence in the
population, the states ranged from a low of 0.7 in Vermont to a high
of 7.9 times their presence in the population in Iowa.'
These cumulative disparities result in extraordinary racial dispro-
portions in juvenile confinement in residential placements. While
15 CRIM. JUST. 30, 32 (2000). One reason for this disparity may be the way minority boys are
viewed by those who administer the juvenile justice system. Gurian-Sherman described the
findings of sociologists George Bridges and Sara Steen:
U luvenile probation officers consistently portray African American and white of-
fenders differently. African American youth were situated similarly in the study to
white youth in age, crimes charged, and criminal history. Bridges and Steen re-
viewed reports by probation officers prior to sentencing that included facts and
perceptions about the offenders, their families and life circumstances. Probation
officers depicted the crimes committed by African American youth as being
caused by deficiencies in their internal attributes and character, such as disre-
spect for authority or the condoning of criminal behavior. White youth on the
other hand were portrayed as victims of negative environmental factors, such as
internal family conflict or association with delinquent peers.
Id. at 33.
149. Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 2, at 9-10; see also, Coramae Richey Mann, A
Minority View of Juvenile "Justice,"51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465, 472 (1994).
150. African American youth were detained in 38% of drug offense cases, while white
youth were detained in only 14% of drug offense cases. Poe-Yamagata &Jones, supra note
2, at 10.
151. Id. at 14.
152. Id. For drug offenses, 0.7% of white youth were waived, while 1.8% of black youth
were waived to adult court for criminal prosecution. Id.
153. See id.; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
COURT STATISTICS 29 (1996) (stating that 1.4% of formally processed cases involving black
juveniles were waived, compared with 0.8% of cases involving whites and juveniles of other
races).
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black youth are only 15% of the adolescent population, they represent
40% of those in confinement.15 4 White youth, who are 66% of the
adolescent population, represent only 37% of those in confine-
ment.155 In addition, black youth are much more likely to be sent to
public juvenile facilities, primarily locked local detention facilities or
locked state correctional facilities, which are generally more restrictive
and more prison-like than private facilities. 156 African American
youth as a group also receive longer sentences than white youth for
the same offenses.
1 5 7
TABLE 8: JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFINEMENT, 1997158
% White Black
Population 66 15
Residential Placement 37 40
Public Residential Placement 34 40
Private Residential Placement 46 39
Residential Placement for
Drug Offenses 23 56
Adult Prison 25 58
National Custody Rate for 204 1,018
Residential Placement (per 100,000) (per 100,000)
Maryland's Custody Rate for 123 592
Residential Placement (per 100,000) (per 100,000)
Apart from the obvious detriments of confinement in juvenile fa-
cilities, African American youth who are confined in juvenile facilities
often find themselves in rural, predominantly white, environments. 159
These facilities are often far from family members, which makes fam-
ily therapy or continuity of relationships almost impossible. 6 ' In ad-
dition, employees in these juvenile facilities are often from these same
predominantly white rural areas, and studies have noted that relation-
ships between these predominantly white guards and their charges are
often hostile and characterized by overt racial prejudice.'61 Finally,
154. OFFICE OFJUVENILEJUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VIcrIMs: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT (1999); Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 2, at 2.
155. Poe-Yamagata &Jones, supra note 2, at 2.
156. Id. at 18.
157. Barry C. Feld, The Social Context ofJuvenile Justice Administration: Racial Disparities in
an Urban Juvenile ourt, in MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 66, supra note 129, at 73.
158. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 154; Poe-
Yamagata & Jones, supra note 2.
159. Mann, supra note 137, at 474-75.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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there are very few minority mental health professionals working in ju-
venile correctional facilities.
1 62
For troubled youth, the juvenile justice system is often their final
opportunity to receive needed mental health and educational ser-
vices. 6 ' Race is a key factor in determining whether a juvenile who
"has gotten in trouble" will receive mental health treatment or con-
finement in a juvenile facility. This decision is crucial, because nu-
merous studies have documented the severe lack of mental health and
other rehabilitative services in juvenile correctional facilities, so
juveniles sent to those facilities are unlikely to receive beneficial ser-
vices.164 Juvenile court decision makers who choose between place-
ment in a mental health treatment center or confinement in juvenile
detention much more frequently send white youth to treatment and
black youth to detention.
165
TABLE 9: 1998 MARYLAND STUDY: RACIAL DISPARITIES AMONG
SENTENCING TO RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT V. JUVENILE DETENTION
1 6 6
Disposition White Black
Treatment at Residential Center 120 (35%) 132 (16%)
Juvenile Detention Facility 223 (65%) 672 (84%)
Researchers studied youth who were faced with a disposition of
either mental health treatment or juvenile detention in 1998 in Mary-
land. One-third of white youth were sentenced to mental health treat-
ment, while only one in six African American adolescents were sent
for similar treatment. 167 Black youth were far more likely to be sent to
juvenile detention facilities which often lack any treatment programs
whatsoever. 168 A commenter from the National Center for Juvenile
Justice candidly stated, "Let's be frank. There's a feeling out there
162. Brent Pattison, Minority Youth in Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Cultural Differences and
the Right to Treatment, 16 LAw & INEQ. 573, 583 (1998).
163. Black youths enter a cycle of detention and incarceration instead of treatment,
while white youths are admitted to mental health facilities for similar offenses. See Gurian-
Sherman, supra note 148, at 35.
164. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study ofJuvenile Justice Reform,
79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1077, 1080, 1083 (1995).
165. Todd Richissin, Race Predicts Handling of Most Young Criminals; Care vs. Punishment of
Mentally Ill Youths Correlates with Color; Juvenile Justice Analysis, BALTIMORE SUN, June 25,
1999, at IA; see Poe-Yamagata & Jones, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing disproportionate
detention).
166. Richissin, supra note 165.
167. Id.
168. Id.; see Guriam-Sherman, supra note 148, at 32 (discussing the inadequate services
provided by Maryland detention facilities due to overcrowding).
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when a black kid commits a crime of, 'Oh well, blacks will be blacks.'
A white kid commits the same crime and the reaction is, 'This kid
needs some help.' "169 Similar disparities were evident in studies con-
ducted in Connecticut and New York.' 7 ° Studies also show that even
where white and black youth in the juvenile justice system who were
evaluated for emotional disorders had similar scores on the Child Be-
havior Checklist, black youth were less likely than white youth to be
treated in a psychiatric facility rather than assigned to a correctional
facility. 171
Others have argued that the juvenile justice system has two tracks:
"One for those of families, largely middle- and upper-class, with means
to afford private behavioral health treatment services, and a second
for children of low income families, largely African American, His-
panic American, and Native American children living in single-parent
homes, perhaps surviving through public assistance, children whose
parents know of no treatment options to suggest to juvenile justice
decision makers. 1 7
2
While the educational and literacy levels of youth entering the
juvenile justice system are desperately low, youth sent into juvenile
correctional facilities are less likely to receive appropriate education
services than youth who remain in their communities and in public
schools. 173 In addition, incarcerated youth demonstrate high rates of
169. Richissin, supra note 165.
.170. Stuart L. Kaplan & Joan Busner, A Note on Racial Bias in the Admission of Children and
Adolescents to State Mental Health Facilities Versus Correctional Facilities in New York, 149 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 768, 770 (1992); W.John Thomas et al., Race, Juvenile Justice, and Mental Health:
New Dimensions in Measuring Pervasive Bias, 89J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 615 (1999).
171. Robert Cohen, To Prisons or Hospitals: Race and Referrals in Juvenile Justice, 2 J.
HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR AND UNDERSERVED 248, 248-49 (1991).
172. ARIZONA STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, MINORITY YOUTH ISSUES COM-
MITTEE, EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH: A REPORT ON THE OVER REPRESENTA-
TION OF MINORITY YOUTH IN ARIZONA'S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 73-74 (1993). See also,
Joseph B. Tulman & Mary G. Hynes, Enforcing Special Education Law on Behalf of Incarcerated
Children: A Blueprint for Deconstruction, 18 CHILD. LEGAL. RTS. J. 48, 48-49 (1998) (detailing
how adolescents with access to private services are able to escape the juvenile justice
system).
173. Peter E. Leone & Sheri Meisel, Special Report: Improving Education Services for Students
in Detention and Confinement Facilities, http://www.edjj.org/publications/publ 2_20-99.html
(visited Aug. 15, 2001) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law and Policy); Osa Cof-
fey & Maia Gemignani, Effective Practices in Juvenile Correctional Education: A Study of the Liter-
ature and Research 1980-1992 (1994) (available from ERIC Document Reproduction Service,
ERIC Identifier ED391995).
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mental retardation, emotional disturbance and learning disabilities,
and these special learning needs are not adequately addressed 7 4
The juvenile justice process is highly discretionary. At every junc-
ture, decisions regarding whether to arrest, whether to formally pro-
cess, and what type of disposition to assign are made by decision
makers with a high level of discretion based on factors that are subject
to various interpretations. At every level, race plays a factor in as-
signing African American youth to more punitive approaches, thereby
limiting their access to needed educational and treatment services.
III. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
This exhaustive look at the available data leads to three major
conclusions: first, that African American boys are more likely to be
over identified as disabled or delinquent; second, they are more likely
to be over controlled and under serviced in education, mental health
and juvenile justice programs, and they are more likely to be excluded
from schools; and third, they are more likely, when they can, to avoid
schools and mental health programs, thereby not gaining expected
benefits.
The traditional analysis of these disparities focuses on the charac-
teristics of African American males and their families to "explain"
these extraordinary differences in their experiences in schools,
mental health care systems, and juvenile justice programs.175 These
disparities, it is claimed, reflect their high levels of poverty, single-par-
ent families, lack of parental involvement, an oppositional black male
culture, and a "lack of school readiness." 176 However, as described
above, where researchers have held these other factors steady, race
and gender continue to have a powerful effect on what happens to
African American boys in all of these settings. 177
Over the last twenty years, across a variety of disciplines, research-
ers have developed a greater understanding of the workings of racism.
They have investigated the features of the institutional settings in
which these disparities develop in order to examine the processes that
"create" or enlarge racial and gender differences. Thus, to take pov-
174. See Leone & Meisel, supra note 173, at 4 (providing an overview of the extensive
litigation that has been brought to enforce the rights of incarcerated youth to special edu-
cation services).
175. See generally Sable, supra note 4.
176. See, e.g., Nicholas Zill et al., School Readiness and Children's Developmental Status,
(1995) (available from ERIC Document Reproduction Service, ERIC Identifier
ED389475).
177. See supra Parts I & II.
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erty as an example, one can attempt to explain the achievement gap
between African American males and white males by the much higher
number of African American children living in poverty.'7 Yet, one
could also examine what is different about the schools that poor chil-
dren attend.17 9 We can ask, what is different about the experiences of
African American boys in these institutional settings?
This approach relies on social construction theory.180 The basic
insight of social construction theory is that much of what we accept as
fact is, rather, a culturally influenced interpretation of phenomena.181
We are each born into a society in which a web of social meanings
already exists.'8 2 Our own set of social meanings is profoundly af-
fected not only by the larger society within which we live, but also the
smaller communities of which we are a part.18 3
When we apply categories such as disabled or delinquent, we
think they are based on objective criteria."8 4 Social construction the-
ory guides us to see them as shaped by social, political, economic, me-
dia, and other forces. Social construction theory challenges us to
question the "taken-for-granted" perceptions of events. These percep-
tions can be questioned by listening to the multiple experiences, per-
spectives, and explanations of all of those who participate in
institutional settings.' 85 The dominant perspective - that African
American boys can't learn and don't obey - is reflected in the statistics
described in Part U1.186 Those whose views are less heard, however,
begin to tell a very different story - one in which chaotic and crowded
schools leave little room for attention for students; in which the ste-
reotypes held by institutional actors lead them to assign negative mo-
tives to the ambiguous actions of African American boys, and in which
178. 2001 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 88, at 56.
179. See, e.g., James M. O'Neill, More Minorities Take SAT, But Gap in Scores Grows, THE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 29, 2001, at A3, available at http://inq.philly.com/content/
inquirer/2001/08/29/national/SAT29.htm?template=APrint.htm (quoting Gaston
Caperton, president of the College Board, an association of colleges that administers the
Scholastic Assessment Test, who stated, "This opportunity gap is very alarming to us. The
real difference is the quality of education that students have had. We need a Marshall Plan
to get serious about the gap."); see also 2001 MENTAL HEALTH DATA, supra note 88, at 54
(acknowledging that African American children are more likely to attend "substandard"
schools).
180. Glennon, supra note 56, at 1242-44.
181. Id. at 1244.
182. Id. at 1243.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1301-02.
185. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference, in POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW: A CIVIL
RIGHTS READER 17-18 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds. 1995).
186. See supra Part II.
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cultural differences result in interactions that are difficult, frustrating
and often painful for all involved. This story is not about the objective
and benign use of classifications and labels to help children. Instead,
it is a story of racial discrimination.
The understanding of racial discrimination articulated by our le-
gal culture has diverged sharply from the understanding of racism de-
veloped over the last twenty years or so. Our legal culture has defined
racial discrimination primarily as "intentional discrimination"'1 8 7 ex-
emplified by segregated schools and public accommodations. Al-
though few would now declare themselves to be racists, African
Americans continue to experience racism as an everyday occurrence,
and numerous statistics demonstrate differential treatment in many
spheres.188
Rather than focusing on the explicit intent or desire of a person
to discriminate against another, theorists define racism as "any behav-
ior or pattern of behavior that tends to systematically deny access to
opportunities or privileges to members of one racial group while per-
petuating access to opportunities and privileges to members of another
racial group."1 89
Another definition of racism focuses on the assignment of differ-
ence across racial lines:
[R]acism [means] . . . the generalization, institutionaliza-
tion, and assignment of values to real or imaginary differ-
ences between people in order to justify a state of privilege,
aggression, and/or violence. Involving more than the cogni-
tive or affective content of prejudice, racism is expressed be-
haviorally, institutionally, and culturally. The ideas or
actions of a person, the goals or practices of an institution,
and the symbols, myths or structure of a society are racist if
(a) imaginary or real differences of race are accentuated; (b)
these differences are assumed absolute and considered in
187. Intentional discrimination means that a person has consciously chosen to treat peo-
ple differently because of their race. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976) (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1995)); Charles R. Lawrence, The Id,
The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318-19
(1987).
188. See, e.g., CassandraJones Havard, African-American Farmers and Fair Lending: Racializ-
ing Rural Economic Space, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 333 (2001) (describing racial discrimina-
tion in federal agricultural loan programs); Desiree Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The
Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection, 66 Mo. L. Rav. 275 (2001) (describing the every-
day racism in retail settings); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity:
Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 296 (2001) (detail-
ing everyday racial bias in street level policing).
189. Ridley et al., supra note 114, at 66 (emphasis added).
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terms of superior and inferior; and (c) these are used tojus-
tify inequity, exclusion or domination.1 90
Most often, such behavior is not intentional.' Lack of inten-
tionality does not, however, eliminate the harm caused by racism. 192
For example, racial disparities in the placement of special education
have been widely known and reported on for thirty years now, yet they
continue to persist and undermine the educational opportunities of
African American boys.' 9 3
A number of theories have been developed to explain noninten-
tional racism. Two main categories include structural or institutional-
ized racism, which focuses on how the structures of society perpetuate
and reinforce racism, 194 and unconscious racism, which focuses on
the ways in which unconscious but deeply held racist beliefs damage
the interactions among people of different races. 19 5 These two forms
of racism work together.'96 Structural systems and individual behavior
are interrelated, reinforcing and perpetuating each other."'
Structural racism describes the striking disparities in the lives of
white and black Americans.' White Americans overwhelmingly con-
trol material resources and power. 199 They continue to run America's
corporations and government and schools.2"' African American chil-
dren are twice as likely as white children to grow up in poverty.20 1
Black children continue to predominantly attend schools that are
under funded and under resourced, often lacking the basics of a qual-
ity education. 2 2 Likewise, they are more likely to receive mental
190. HUSSEIN ABDILAHI BULHAN, FRANTZ FANON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPPRESSION 13
(1985).
191. See Lawrence, supra note 187, at 323.
192. See id. at 319-20.
193. Harry & Anderson, Social Construction, supra note 57, at 35-36; Glennon, supra note
56, at 1250-52.
194. Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholar-
ship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129 (1989).
195. Lawrence, supra note 187, at 321-44.
196. See Kennedy, supra note 188, nn. 166-171 and accompanying text.
197. See id.
198. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); Roy BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERI-
CAN RACE PROBLEM (1990).
199. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000, 447,
475-76 (2000). While 48.9% of white families earn $50,000 or more, 28.4% of African
American families earn $50,000 or more; while 8% of white families live below the poverty
line, 23.4% of black families live below the poverty line. Id.
200. Rush, Sharing Space, supra note 15, at 21.
201. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 199, at 476.
202. See supra Part II.A.
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health and health care in publicly funded settings that tend to employ
less experienced staff, in which continuity of care is rarely available,
and where funding constraints limit the quantity and quality of the
service provided. 2 3 African American youth who break the law are
more likely to be caught, and once in the system, to be given harsher
treatment at every stage in the system. 20 4
Racism also damages human relationships. Interpersonal rela-
tionships within even under funded schools and busy community
mental health clinics create the possibility of building safe and nurtur-
ing relationships that promote learning, development and healing.
Yet, this essential basis for quality learning, effective mental health
treatment and rehabilitation is all too often lacking, undermined by
unconscious racism.20 5
Unconscious racism creates cognitive distortions that reinforce
racist beliefs and sets in place a spiraling process of interactive failures
that has been described as "reciprocal distancing. ' 20 6 The theories of
cognitive distortion and reciprocal distancing challenge the belief that
characteristics such as behavior and ability are fixed within the indi-
vidual.20 7 In doing so, they point out how fundamentally subject to
interpersonal interactions they are.20 8
Studies of attitudes towards other racial groups show that Cauca-
sian Americans tend to hold negative feelings toward African Ameri-
cans. 20 9  These racial stereotypes create significant cognitive
distortions.210 Individuals seek out and pay more attention to infor-
mation that is relevant to the stereotype or that confirms their precon-
ceptions and ignore or forget information that disconfirms or
contradicts expectations. 2 1 In addition, people are likely to see ste-
reotypes confirmed even if the behavior is ambiguous or actually con-
tradicts their expectations.212 For example, when white students were
203. See supra Part ll.B.
204. See supra Part II.C.
205. See Lawrence, supra note 187, at 32944.
206. Sharone Maital, Reciprocal Distancing: A Systems Model of Interpersonal Processes in Cross-
Cultural Consultation, 29 SCH. PSYCHOL. REv. 389, 390 (2000).
207. See id. at 390-91.
208. See id.
209. Charles M. Judd et al., Stereotypes and Ethnocentrism: Diverging Interethnic Perceptions of
African American Youth and White American Youth, 69 J. PERsoNALiTy & Soc. PSYCHOL. 460,
461 (1995).
210. See Lawrence, supra note 187, at 339 (explaining how individuals interpret past
events in ways that support and reconfirm stereotyped beliefs).
211. Id.; see also WALTER STEPHAN, REDUCING PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPING IN SCHOOLS 7-
13 (1999).
212. STEPHAN, supra note 211, at 9.
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shown a tape of either a white or a black male pushing another per-
son, 75% of the viewers saw the black male as violent, while only 17%
saw the white male as violent in the exact same scenario. 1
Finally, and most importantly, people base their own behavior to-
ward different racial groups on those stereotypes.2 14 Anticipating neg-
ative behavior or lack of ability changes how one person approaches
another.215 The person who is the subject of that stereotype may well
react to the negativity by acting in ways that confirm those initial stere-
otypical expectations.21 6
The second description of unconscious racism emphasizes the re-
ciprocal effects of racial and cultural differences. 217 This term de-
scribes a process of progressive disengagement resulting from a series
of "interactive failures" that occur between students and teachers,
therapists and patients, juvenile court officers andjuveniles. 21 8 Initial
failures in interaction lead to mutual feelings of failure, frustration
and disappointment.219 The child who feels hurt may withdraw. 220
The professional's "feelings of anger and guilt may then result in la-
beling the child as a way of attributing the failure to stable characteris-
tics of the child or the situation. '"221 The process involves both
cognitive and emotional aspects. At the cognitive level, meanings are
ascribed to actions taken by the other, and the negative feelings asso-
ciated with the interaction can lead people to interact differently in
the future.222 Thus, children who believe that they can never please
the teacher are apt to see that belief confirmed by the teacher's behav-
ior and, because of the negative feelings associated with that confirma-
tion, avoid or otherwise limit their chances of being hurt again. 223
Teachers, unwilling to see themselves as failures, will often provide
explanations for the failed interactions that have to do with the chil-
dren's own characteristics or those of their family.22 4
213. Id.
214. Id. at 12.
215. Id.
216. Id. For example, a teacher expecting a group of students to be slow learners may
assign less difficult material and may give students less feedback and encouragement in
completing their tasks. In return, the students may not try as hard, thus, acting in ways
which confirm the teacher's low expectations. Id.
217. See Maital, supra note 206, at 389.
218. Id. at 390-91.
219. Id. at 391.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 391.
224. See id. at 394-95. For example, a teacher may believe that the child is disabled,
uncooperative, or that the family does not value education. Id.
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In the institutional contexts of education, mental health and juve-
nile justice, these processes of cognitive distortions based on stereo-
types and reciprocal distancing take place in situations of power
imbalances. 225 Teachers and other professionals in schools, treatment
facilities, and juvenile court settings, because of their power, are more
likely to act on their cognitive and emotional reactions in ways that
negatively change the lives of the children involved.226 Parents tend
to have little power to exert on behalf of their children. Thus the
labels imposed in these settings - disabled, uncooperative, delinquent,
dangerous - may adhere to and harm children subject to this type of
stereotyping.
These interactive processes of structural and unconscious racism
create dramatic disparities in areas such as placement in ability groups
and special education, and in the use of discipline in schools, mental
health treatment services and the programs that are offered to
them.22 7 In addition, they make the restrictiveness and punitiveness
of the juvenile justice system seem natural and normal. 22' They are
further made to appear normal by a jurisprudence concerning racial
discrimination that not only makes them invisible and unimportant,
but makes voluntary efforts to diminish the inequalities unconstitu-
tional and places legal challenges to these processes out of the hands
of private individuals.229
To date, structural and unconscious racism have received little
recognition or support in this Nation's courts. Instead, the courts
have gone down a quite different path - one in which only intentional
discrimination is actionable, institutional practices designed to allevi-
ate current and historical societal discrimination are illegal, and pri-
vate litigants are unable to bring private rights of action to challenge
institutional practices that, like the practices outlined here, dispropor-
tionately and adversely affect people of color.23 0 This approach, justi-
225. See id. (noting the inbalance of power between the student and the teacher); Poe-
Yamagata &Jones, supra note 2, at 6 (explaining that the discretionary aspect of whether to
arrest an individual is subject to police bias); see also 2001 MENTAL HEALTH REPORT, supra
note 88; 2000 MENrAL HEALTH REPORT, supra note 89 (discussing the biases present in the
doctor/patient relationship and in the diagnosis of mental health).
226. See STEPHAN, supra note 211, at 12 (acknowledging that the teacher's reaction to the
student may limit the student's ability to succeed because the student is never given the
opportunity to attempt the more challenging subject matters).
227. See 1998 OCR DATA, supra note 30, at 1.
228. See supra Part I.
229. See infra, notes 233-260 and accompanying text.
230. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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fled by the principle of "color-blindness," serves to leave in place a
pervasive condition of racial inequality. 231
This blindness to the condition of racial inequality has led the
U.S. Supreme Court to require that plaintiffs alleging racial discrimi-
nation prove that the discrimination was intentional - proof of dis-
criminatory effect is not sufficient.23 2 In Keyes v. SchoolDistrict 1,23 the
Court held that defacto segregation of a school district did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 4
Where a school district or state did not have an explicit policy of seg-
regating students, the Court required plaintiffs to demonstrate that
school officials had the purpose or intent to segregate. 2 " This deci-
sion ignores the extreme negative impact of segregated school
districts.
The Court reiterated its position that violations of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, absent a stated discriminatory policy, require discrimi-
natory intent in Washington v. Davis.23 6 In Davis, the Court rejected a
challenge to an employment test with a failure rate for black appli-
cants of four times the rate for white applicants, and no clear rele-
vance to the police officer position for which the test was being
used.237 Once again, plaintiffs were required to prove discriminatory
intent by showing that the police department employed the test with
the purpose or intent of discriminating against African Americans. 23 1
The Court refused to describe the use of an unsubstantiated employ-
ment test that presented an extraordinary disparate impact on African
Americans as racial discrimination. 23 9
The Supreme Court's insistence on color-blindness has led lower
federal courts to view affirmative efforts by public schools to address
longstanding racial inequities and school segregation with the greatest
skepticism. For example, the First Circuit rejected a minimal affirma-
tive action policy governing admissions to the premier public school
in Boston, Massachusetts, Boston Latin.24° Students, predominantly
white, who attended private schools were better prepared and per-
231. See Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 11, at 106.
232. Freeman, supra note 12, at 1056.
233. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
234. Id. at 205-08.
235. Id. at 205-06. Professor Freeman described this occurrence as the "perpetrator per-
spective." Freeman, supra note 12, at 1052-57.
236. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
237. Id. at 242, 246.
238. Id. at 241-42.
239. Id. at 24546.
240. Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 808-09 (1st Cir. 1998).
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formed better on the standardized test than did students from public
schools.24' Students from the predominantly minority Boston Public
Schools received little or no training for the standardized test, and
many elementary schools in Boston had never sent a single child to
Boston Latin.242 In addition, the test had never been validated for the
purpose for which it was used and had a disproportionate effect on
minority students.243 Despite the clear racial and ethnic inequality in
access to Boston Latin, the First Circuit concerned itself only with pro-
tecting the rights of the few white children who might not gain en-
trance to the school because of the admissions program.244
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit rejected a Montgomery County, Ma-
ryland school transfer program that limited the ability of students to
transfer schools if their move would decrease the level of integration
in the school they were assigned to attend.245 Without considering
whether the denial of a transfer harmed the student in any way other
than that his denial was based on a racial classification, the court re-
jected the school district's argument that the racial balancing it at-
tempted to accomplish through the transfer program served a
compelling governmental interest in preventing racial isolation.2 4 6
The program was rejected even though it was part of the school dis-
241. Id. at 820 (Lipez,J., dissenting); see also, Karen Avenso, Relatively Few Schools Fill Most
Seats at Boston Latin, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 29, 1996, at Al (noting that students attending
private and parochial schools are predominately white and are better prepared by educa-
tors and their parents for the Independent School Entrance Exam, ISSE, a standardized
test used for admission to Boston Latin School).
242. Avenso, supra note 241. Seventy percent of the 513 students entering Boston Latin
in 1996 came from private schools or just five of the seventy-five public elementary schools
in Boston. See id.
243. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 819 (Lipez, J., dissenting); see supra Avenso note 241 (point-
ing out that students attending private and parochial schools were disproportionately white
and better prepared for standardized test employed). Understandably, the Boston Public
Schools did not seek to admit any evidence concerning whether the test used had a dis-
criminatory effect. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 803. Perhaps this evidence would have been
before the court had the petition of the Boston Branch of the NAACP to intervene been
granted. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 819 (Lipez, J., dissenting)
244. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 808. The court protected the right to be admitted based on
the numerical results of test scores that were not statistically significant in predicting aca-
demic success. See also Defeat for Diversity at Boston Latin, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 1998, at
A26.
245. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999); see also
Tuttle v. Arlington Cry. School Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 704-05 (4th Cir. 1999). But see Brewer v.
West Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that transfer pro-
grams that denied transfers from city school district to suburban school district to white
students was justified by the school district's compelling interest in reducing racial isola-
tion in the involved schools).
246. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 131.
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trict's voluntary effort to dismantle its former system of racial
segregation.
2 47
The Supreme Court stepped further away from recognizing the
pervasive reality of racial and ethnic discrimination in our governmen-
tal and federally funded institutions in its recent decision in Alexander
v. Sandoval,24s in which the Court found that no private cause of ac-
tion exists under the Title VI regulations. 249 As demonstrated by the
cases discussed below, Sandoval reverses thirty years of litigation under
Title VI and Title IX.2 5 ° The majority in Sandoval acknowledged that
Congress authorized federal agencies to promulgate "rules, regula-
tions, or orders of general applicability" to effectuate the proscrip-
tions of Sections 601 and 602 of Title VI.251 Yet, the Court took great
pains to reinforce its earlier findings that Section 601 forbids only in-
tentional discrimination, and in fact, allows recipients of federal finan-
cial assistance to engage in practices that have a discriminatory effect
as long as the discriminatory effect is not intentional. 252 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, concluded that the search for whether a con-
gressional intent to create a private cause of action under the regula-
tion existed must begin and end with the text of Section 602.253 In
that inquiry, the majority held that Congress did not clearly evidence
the intent to create a private cause of action under the Title VI regula-
tions.2 54 In so doing, the Court ignored the many times it had relied
on the presumption that at the time the Title VI regulations were
promulgated, it was assumed that Congress intended to permit private
causes of action in order to protect individual rights guaranteed by
federal law.255 Over the last thirty years, nearly every federal Court of
Appeals and numerous district courts have either silently accepted or
expressly permitted private individuals to pursue disparate impact
claims under the Title VI regulations.256
While the dissent in Sandoval anticipated that private plaintiffs
would still be permitted to judicially enforce the Title VI regulations
through § 1983,257 this avenue for judicial redress appears increas-
247. Id. at 125.
248. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
249. Id. at 293.
250. See infra Part IV.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, 2000d-1 (1994); see also Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278.
252. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281.
253. Id. at 288.
254. Id. at 292-3.
255. Id. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 301 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Section 1983 states:
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ingly unlikely. The Third Circuit recently determined that the Tide
VI disparate impact regulations cannot be enforced via § 1983,
thereby overruling the conclusion it had reached only two years ear-
lier that such an action was permitted.258 The Third Circuit found
that the regulations are "too far removed from Congressional intent
to constitute a 'federal right' enforceable under § 1983. "1259 The
Third Circuit noted that the majority in Sandoval repeatedly empha-
sized that the statutory language of Title VI only supports a claim for
intentional discrimination and refused to acknowledge that the Title
VI regulations, which prohibit actions that have a discriminatory im-
pact as well as actions taken with discriminatory intent, are valid.26°
This emphasis suggests that Sandoval may lay the groundwork for the
Supreme Court to go even further and eliminate enforcement of dis-
parate impact regulations by federal agencies as well.
As the analysis of the data concerning the deeply troubling dis-
parities in the treatment of African American boys demonstrates, ad-
vocates must fight to preserve the disparate impact regulations and
the right of private plaintiffs to enforce them in court. Judicial rejec-
tion of private actions, either directly under the regulations or
through § 1983, does not have to be the final word. Congress could
overturn these decisions as it has done in the past. For instance, Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991261 to protect the scope of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.262 Congress, at the strenuous
urging of civil rights advocates, passed the statute to overrule the Su-
preme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio,2 63 as
Every person who, under color of any statute, [or] regulation... of any State...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other per-
son within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
258. South Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 788 (3d
Cir. 2001) (overruling Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999)). The right to sue
under § 1983 to enforce the Title VI regulations was also rejected in Bonnie L. v. Bush, 180
F. Supp.2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2001). Only one court has permitted an action under the Title
VI regulations to go forward under § 1983 since the Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval.
Lucero v. Detroit Pub. Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
259. South Camden, 274 F.3d at 790.
260. See id. at 789-90. The Court merely "assume[s] for purposes of deciding this case
that regulations promulgated under § 602 may validly proscribe activities that have a dispa-
rate impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible under § 601."
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275.
261. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a), 2000e-2 (1994).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
263. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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well as other judicial decisions restricting the scope of Title VII which
made it more difficult for plaintiffs to assert a disparate impact claim
under Title VII.264 Even earlier, Congress had enacted the Civil
Rights Restoration Act 265 after the Supreme Court handed down Grove
City College v. Bell,266 which found that Title IX's impact was restricted
to the specific program or activity within an educational institution
that actually received the federal funds.267 Federal agencies had ap-
plied this ruling beyond Title IX to Title VI and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as well. 26' The Civil Rights Restoration Act
explicitly provided that as long as an entity accepts federal funds, all
programs within the entity are bound by the terms of these civil rights
statutes.269
In both of these situations, civil rights advocates launched a force-
ful case on behalf of Congressional action to reinstate rights essential
to effective civil rights enforcement. The judicial decisions eliminat-
ing a private right of action and cause of action under § 1983 to en-
force the Title VI regulations deserve an equally strong Congressional
response. The discussion that follows highlights the promise of litiga-
tion under the Title VI disparate impact regulations to alleviate the
racial disparities that affect the treatment of African American boys by
our public institutions. This promise, however, will quickly disappear
without access to the courts.
IV. REQUIRING THAT EDUCATION, MENTAL HEALTH AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE PROGRAMS BE EQUALLY EFFECTIVE FOR AFRICAN
AMERICAN BOys
These judicial interpretations regarding discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VI, and the exclusion of private liti-
gants from judicial enforcement of the Title VI regulations, do not
264. Congressional intent to overturn Wards Cove and a number of other judicial deci-
sions to limit the scope of Tide VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is explained in the House
Report accompanying the legislation. H.R. REP,. No. 102-40(I), at 23-93 (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 561-83.
265. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1687, 1688; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a; 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
266. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
267. Id. at 574. The decision was made under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, which ban discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program which re-
ceives federal funding. Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)). See infta Part V.B (describing Title IX in greater depth).
268. HALPERN, supra note 14, at 198-200. See infra Part IV.A (providing a detailed
description of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
269. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codi-
fied at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1687, 1688; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a; 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
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exemplify what we have come to understand about structural and un-
conscious racism. While this judicial blindness to racial discrimina-
tion threatens to undermine enforcement of the Title VI regulations,
this Article focuses instead on the promise of these regulations.27 °
The task here is to examine the interpretive space that is available
under the Title VI regulations to employ them to further racial equal-
ity. Under this approach, racial equality means that in the three con-
texts considered here, governmental programs would be "equally
effective" in serving African American boys as they are in serving other
children.
In order to evaluate the remaining interpretive space, this Article
looks beyond judicial interpretation of the Title VI regulations, to Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), which bans discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability,271 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), which bans discrimination on the
basis of gender.272 Discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender
and disability have their own very different histories, and these cannot
be collapsed or ignored. Yet, in the contexts of disability, gender and
race, longstanding societal beliefs and widespread practices rendered
the fact of discrimination almost invisible. It was long considered
"normal" to expect that children with disabilities would either be insti-
tutionalized, segregated in separate schools and classrooms, or hidden
at home.273 Similarly, it was "normal" for adults with disabilities to be
unemployed or for girls to limit their ambitions to motherhood or a
few select professions.27 4 In the area of race, it was "normal" for racial
groups to live, attend school and work separately, and for African
Americans to hold positions of service rather than power.
The history of the race, disability and gender civil rights move-
ments has included sustained challenges to widespread and deeply
held beliefs that these and other inequities were normal, predictable
and based not on bias, but on real and important differences among
people. 275 These movements have challenged the notions that indi-
270. While this article does not pursue an analysis of the intersection of discrimination
based on race and gender, or even race, gender and disability, such claims should also be
considered. See Kimberlh Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
271. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
272. 20 U.S.C. § 1618 (1994).
273. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(E) (Supp. V 1999).
274. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role
of Law, in FEMINiST LEGAL THEORY- FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
275. See, e.g., id.
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viduals with disabilities cannot learn or work, that women's lives are
centered in the home, and that racial segregation and inequality are
acceptable.2 7 6 They have challenged the belief that changes in the
practices of our social institutions would make no difference in in-
creasing equality because the limitations or disparities are caused not
by those institutional practices, but rather from individual limitations,
desires and choices.
We are past the days when state education laws permitted school
officials to deny entrance to the "uneducable," when classified job list-
ings were separated by gender, and when African Americans were
punished for crossing the color line in stores, waiting rooms and pub-
lic transportation. However, we still see that deeply held beliefs about
what is "normal" affect our ability to see discrimination. Thus, many
continue to argue that children with disabilities would be better
served in segregated classrooms, that women need fewer athletic op-
portunities than men, and that African American boys experience
greatly reduced success in school because of differences related to the
characteristics of individuals or group characteristics, differences that
cannot be affected by changes in institutional practices. We have too
often accepted as fact that governmental programs cannot be equally
effective for members of these groups.
This article looks across the areas of disability, gender and racial
discrimination to highlight the possibility that Section 504, Title IX
and Title VI can be interpreted to require governmental agencies and
other recipients of federal funds to transform their programs to be
"equally effective" at serving individuals with disabilities, females and
racial minorities. While "equally effective" as a phrase is not widely
used in the regulations under any of these statutes, it provides an af-
firmative description of the explicit regulatory mandates.
The "equal effectiveness" standard can be the basis for directly
challenging beliefs that inequalities are due to characteristics of the
protected class rather than the result of discriminatory institutional
practices. In order to hold these programs accountable for failing to
provide equally effective services, litigants need to highlight and call
into question the long accepted institutional practices that prevent
programs from effectively meeting the learning, mental health and
rehabilitation needs of African American boys. They must also be pre-
pared to successfully rebut the argument that it is the characteristics
of African American boys rather than institutional practices that pre-
vent the services from being more effective.
276. See id.
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A. Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974277 and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990278 (ADA) are the two civil rights stat-
utes that protect individuals with disabilities.2 7 9 Section 504 was
enacted to combat discrimination on the basis of disability by recipi-
ents of federal monies,2 8 ° while the ADA prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability in employment, public services (including trans-
portation), public accommodations and telecommunications. 281
Under Section 504, federal agencies were charged with implementing
regulations.2 8 2 The Departments of Education ("DOE"), Health and
Human Services ("HHS"), and Justice ("DOJ") have promulgated the
following regulations:
A recipient, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not
... on the basis of handicap: . . . Provide a qualified handi-
capped person with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as
effective as that provided to others; . . . For the purposes of
this part, aids, benefits, and services, to be equally effective
are not required to produce the identical result or level of
achievement for handicapped and nonhandicapped persons,
but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain
the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of
achievement, in the most integrated setting appropriate to the per-
son's needs.283
The regulations also prohibit recipients of federal funds from utilizing
"criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of sub-
277. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1999).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1995).
279. See generally, Curtis D. Edmonds, Four Emerging Issues in Americans with Disabilities Act
Litigation Involving Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers, 20 REv. LITIG. 623 (2001); Rob-
ert Silverman, Emerging Disability Policy Framework: A Guidepost for Analyzing Public Policy, 85
IowA L. REv. 1691 (2000).
280. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a) (1999).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1994).
282. 29 U.S.C. § 791(f)(1),(2) (1999).
283. DOE, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Re-
ceiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 104.4 (b) (1)-(b) (2) (2000); HHS, Nondis-
crimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance, 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b) (1)-(b) (2) (2001) (emphasis added). The relevant DOJ reg-
ulations include slight grammatical differences, but the substance of the text and the lan-
guage is nearly identical. DOJ, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and
Local Government Services, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (1) (iii) (2001); DOJ, Enforcement of
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs or Activities Conducted by the
Department ofJustice, 28 C.F.R. § 39.130(b) (1) (iii) (2001); DOJ, Implementation of Exec-
utive Order 12250, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Federally Assisted Pro-
grams 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(1) (iii) (2001).
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jecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis
of handicap, [or] (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipi-
ent's program . .. with respect to handicapped persons."
284
Section 504 and the ADA have led to some dramatic societal
changes. They have literally changed the face of our society by man-
dating that buildings be readily accessible to disabled persons. 2 5 Pub-
lic transportation is more accessible, and many sidewalks, public
arenas and other facilities now are designed to accommodate wheel-
chair users. They have helped to dramatically increase the percentage
of individuals with disabilities who attend college 286 and are
employed.28 7
Individuals with disabilities have challenged the failure of em-
ployers to make "reasonable accommodations" in the workplace.288
They have been successful where they have focused courts away from
employer arguments that individual limitations, not employer choices,
impede the individual's ability to work. Employers have been re-
284. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b) (4); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(4) (emphasis added). Again, the
relevant DOJ regulations includes slight grammatical differences, but the substance of the
text and language is nearly identical. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3); 28 C.F.R.
§ 39.130(b) (3); 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b) (3).
285. See DOJ, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations
and in Commercial Facilities 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (2001); HHS, Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Handicap in Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34
C.F.R. § 104.21-.23 (2000). See, e.g., Cheatham County (TN) Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 181
(2000) (increasing accessibility of its elementary school playground), Donna (TX) Inde-
pendent Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 73 (2000) (obtaining commitment from school district to
install an elevator to make the second floor of the school accessible), Metropolitan Nash-
ville-Davidson County (TN) Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 271 (2000) (finding that accessibility is-
sues had been remedied by new school construction), Dallas County (MO) R-1 Sch. Dist.,
34 IDELR 183 (2000) (obtaining commitments to modify bathroom, parking facilities, and
drinking fountains at middle school and to develop plan for improving gymnasium accessi-
bility in the high school).
286. A recent survey found that while only 29% of individuals with disabilities had com-
pleted some college in 1986, that by 2000, nearly half of adults with disabilities had com-
pleted some college. National Organization on Disability, Education and Disability Statistics:
A Historical Perspective, http://www.nod.org/const/dsp-cont_itemview.cfm (July 25, 2001)
(on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
287. The percentage of persons with disabilities who say they can work who are em-
ployed has increased from 46% to 56% in the last fifteen years. National Organization on
Disability, Employment Rates of People with Disabilities, http://www.nod.org/const/
dsp-cont itemview.cfm (July 24, 2001) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law &
Policy).
288. The concept was judicially created under Section 504 and specifically codified in
the ADA. LAuRA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITY LAw 170 (1995); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1995);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2001). Under the ADA, employers are required to make any ac-
commodation that would not result in undue hardship to them. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
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quired to accommodate workers with disabilities by eliminating heavy
lifting,2 9 transferring or reassigning employees or creating a new po-
sition for employees, 29 0 and changing work responsibilities or work
environment. 291 These work place modifications demonstrate the
possibility of deconstructing the able-bodied norm in order to create a
workplace that is reasonably accommodating to individuals who fall
outside that norm.
The Section 504 regulations make it clear that programs must
make their aids, benefits and services "equally effective" for individu-
als with disabilities. 2 2 Despite this language, the United States Su-
preme Court has hesitated to find that Section 504 prohibits practices
that have a disparate negative impact on individuals with disabilities.
In Alexander v. Choate,293 the Court stated, "[w]hile we reject the
boundless notion that all disparate-impact showings constitute a
prima facie case under § 504, we assume without deciding that § 504
reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate im-
pact upon the handicapped. 29 4 Despite this lack of clarity, a number
of courts have found that Section 504 provides for claims of disparate
negative impact.2 5 This trend has been limited, however, by ajudicial
willingness in some cases to protect long accepted norms of institu-
289. See, e.g., Tuck v. HCA Health Serv. of Tennessee, 842 F. Supp. 988 (M.D. Tenn
1992) (finding in non-jury trial that hospital failed to reasonably accommodate an em-
ployee who had injured her back while working, and that the hospital should have trans-
ferred her to available positions which entailed light duty).
290. See, e.g., Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999). "[W]here
a comparable position is vacant and the disabled employee is qualified for the position, an
employer's refusal to reassign the employee to that position - absent some other offer of
reasonable accommodation - constitutes a violation of the ADA." Id. at 99. See, e.g.,
Vollmert v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., 197 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that the
employer failed to reasonably accommodate learning disabled employee when it trans-
ferred her without meeting her training needs).
291. See, e.g., Marcano-Rivera v. Pueblo Intern, Inc., 232 F.3d 245 (1st Cir. 2000) (find-
ing that the employer failed to accommodate employee with amputated legs who was re-
quired to work cash register at busy Limes which forced her to install specially designed
stool and move herself from her wheelchair to the stool in front of impatient customers);
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the
employer could not ignore employee's request for accommodation for hearing impair-
ment by relocating loud speaker).
292. Recipients cannot provide a service "that is not as effective as that provided to
others." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (1) (iii) (2001); 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b) (1) (iii) (2000); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.4(b) (1) (iii) (2001).
293. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
294. Id. at 299.
295. See, e.g., Berg v. Florida Dep't of Labor and Employment Security, 163 F.3d 1251,
1254 (11th Cir. 1998); Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); Robinson
v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1145 (D. Kan. 2000); Galusha v. New York Dep't of Envt.
Conservation, 27 F. Supp. 2d 117 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
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tional practice. Courts have refused to order changes to program-
matic elements considered "essential" to the program.
For example, in Guckenberger v. Boston University,296 students with
disabilities challenged, inter alia, the requirement that they success-
fully complete four semesters of foreign language courses in order to
graduate. 297 Based on a record of deliberations by a University com-
mittee that had considered the issue and determined that it was an
essential feature of the academic program, the court found that the
University's refusal to waive the foreign language requirement did not
violate Section 504 or the ADA.298 In this instance, the court accepted
a "norm" that had been developed originally in the absence of individ-
uals with disabilities, despite the heavy burden it placed on some stu-
dents with disabilities. 29 Some courts have accepted testing norms300
and eight semester rules for participation in high school athletic pro-
grams.3 °1 In these cases, the failure to "qualify" for the benefit is seen
as resting within the individual's limitations, not institutional norms.
Other courts, however, have rejected the application of these
norms. An Oregon court rejected the eight-semester limitation on
participation in high school athletic programs, finding that its primary
purpose, to encourage students to graduate in four years, may be in-
appropriate for some students with disabilities.30 2 Many of these cases
demonstrate the importance of persuading courts that the "norm,"
such as completion of high school in four years, is itself open to
challenge.
The Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") has required other substantial
modifications to school programs in ways that also challenged long
developed norms. For example, OCR has required school districts to
296. 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997).
297. Id. at 114.
298. Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass. 1998). In initial litiga-
tion the court found that Boston University's refusal to waive the foreign language require-
ment for some students with learning disabilities was not supported by professional,
academic judgment. Guckenberger, 974 F. Supp. at 149. The Court's second determination
was made in response to its order that the University develop "a deliberative procedure for
considering whether modification of its degree requirements in foreign language would
fundamentally alter the nature of its liberal arts programs." Id. at 154.
299. The courts appear to be less willing to question the professional judgment of pro-
fessional educators in higher education than they are those in elementary and secondary
education. See, Anne P. Dupre, Disability, Deference, and the Integrity of the Academic Enterprise,
32 GA. L. REV. 393 (1998).
300. See, e.g., Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 976 F.2d 791, 793-95 (1st Cir.
1992).
301. See, e.g., McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 119 F.3d 453, 462 (6th
Cir. 1997).
302. Bingham v. Oregon Sch. Activities Assoc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Or. 1999).
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ensure students with disabilities access to field trips, to provide a
fulltime aide, 0 4 to establish equal counseling opportunities 0 5 and
participation in athletic programs, 0 6 to protect students from harass-
ment related to their disabilities,30 7 and to alter testing procedures.3 0 8
B. Title IX
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 bans discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex in any education program which receives fed-
eral dollars.3 11 While the general regulations promulgated by HHS
and DOE under Title IX do not contain disparate impact language,
specific subsections of those regulations do contain language forbid-
ding actions that have the effect of discriminating.3 1 0
In significant ways, Title IX has successfully changed previously
held gender norms regarding the types of education, training and ac-
cess to athletic and other extracurricular opportunities that both men
303. See, e.g., Palm Beach County (FL) Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 38 (2000).
304. See, e.g., Lake Washington (WA) Sch. Dist. No. 414, 33 IDELR 44 (1999)
305. See, e.g., Grand Rapids (MI) Pub. Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 40 (2000).
306. See, e.g., LeRoy (NY) Cent. Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 190 (1999) (requiring that students
with disabilities be given an equal opportunity to participate on interscholastic sports
teams).
307. See, e.g., Georgetown (MA) Pub. Schs., 34 IDELR 65 (2000); Flagler County (FL)
Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR 182 (2000).
308. See, e.g., Prince George's County Pub. Schs., 34 IDELR 95 (2000) (obtaining agree-
ment to provide accommodations for student with disabilities taking state-required writing
test).
309. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
310. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31 (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 86.31 (2001). The DOJ did not promulgate
regulations under Title IX as it is designed for agencies which administer funds for educa-
tion programs. The DOE has implemented regulations which require effective accommo-
dation in the area of athletics. 34 C.F.R. § 106.16.
The DOE has issued the following regulation relating to nondiscrimination in admis-
sion and recruitment:
"A recipient shall not administer or operate any test or other criterion for admis-
sion which has a disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of sex
unless the use of such test or criterion is shown to predict validly success in the
education program or activity in question and alternative tests or criteria which
do not have such a disproportionately adverse effect are shown to be available."
34 C.F.R. § 106.21; see also, 45 C.F.R. § 86.36(b).
The DOE has also issued the following regulation relating to nondiscrimination in
access to course offerings: "Where use of a single standard of measuring skill or progress
in a physical education class has an adverse effect on members of one sex, the recipient
shall use appropriate standards which do not have such effect." 34 C.F.R. § 106.34; see also
45 C.F.R. § 86.34(d).
The DOE regulations provide that: "Where a recipient finds that a particular class
contains a substantially disproportionate number of individuals of one sex, the recipient
shall take such action as necessary to assure itself that such disproportion is not the result
of discrimination on the basis of sex in counseling or appraisal materials by counselors."
34 C.F.R. § 106.36; see also 45 C.F.R. § 86.37.
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and women wanted. More recently, Title IX has been used to chal-
lenge gendered assumptions regarding human interactions within the
school environment.31' As we witness a new generation of girls ex-
pecting to be fighter pilots, astronauts and construction workers, as we
watch girls flock to soccer, basketball and hockey teams, we realize
that in striking ways, the gender norms have changed.
Title IX has served to change the historical norms associated with
sports. Most notably, the Act and its accompanying regulations have
forced society to rethink the assumption that women do not want to
play sports. The implementing regulations accompanying Title IX
call for "equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes."3 12 In
determining whether this mandate is met, one consideration, among
many, is "whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of student athletes
of both sexes[.] ''3 1 3 Courts require "not merely some accommoda-
tion, but full and effective accommodation. "314
311. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). U.S. Dep't of Education,
Title IX: A Sea of Change in Gender Equity in Education, http://www.ed.gov/pubs/
TitlelX/part3.html (last updated July 10, 1997) (on file with the Journal of Health Care
Law and Policy) (describing many of these changes).
312. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2001). When enacted in 1972, Tide IX included "broad
proscriptive language" that caused much anxiety in the world of academia. Cohen v.
Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993). Universities were unsure of the reach
of Tide IX in large part due to the fact that the statute lacked secondary legislative materi-
als. See id. By congressional mandate, in 1975, the former Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, promulgated regulations. See id. Four years later, HEW's Office of Civil
Rights ("OCR"), after notice and comment, published a "Policy Interpretation" that ad-
dressed the issue of equal athletic opportunity. See id., at 893-94. In 1984, the Supreme
Court held that Title IX was "program specific," which meant that the Act could only reach
programs that separately received federal funding. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555, 574 (1984). This holding served as the death knell to the regulations that addressed
athletic programs because those programs are not direct recipients of federal monies. See
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894. Congress responded to the Supreme Court's ruling by passing the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988). The Act made clear that
as long as a university accepted federal funds, the entire university was required to comply
with Title IX. See id. The floor debate demonstrates that a key purpose behind the legisla-
tion was to create equality for female athletic programs. See id.
313. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1) (citing nine additional factors; however, the call for effec-
tive accommodation is the most commonly cited factor in litigation); see also Roberts v,
Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 829 (10th Cir. 1993).
314. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831-32; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898. See also Pederson v. Louisiana
State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 269-70
(7th Cir. 1994) (determining that university's decision to terminate male swim team and
not female swim team was a "reasonable response to the requirements of the applicable
[Title IX] regulation and policy interpretation."); Favia v. Indiana Univ., 7 F.3d 332, 343
(3d Cir. 1993) (affirming district court grant of preliminary injunction against university
which cut female gymnastics and field hockey teams); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F.Supp.
989, 995-96 (S.D. Ia. 1992) (affirming district court denial of preliminary injunction
against university brought by male wrestlers after program was eliminated).
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In applying the "effective accommodation" standard, courts have
refused to give credence to arguments that women are less interested
in sports than men.315 When female students sued their university
under Title IX for its failure to field an intercollegiate women's fast
pitch softball and soccer team,31 6 the defendant University argued
that no Title IX violation had occurred because the record failed to
demonstrate a sufficient interest and ability among the female plain-
tiff class.317 The Court of Appeals rejected this attempt to blame the
lack of participation on the desires of the female students, observing
that the "heart of this contention is that an institution with no coach,
no facilities, no varsity team, no scholarships, and no recruiting in a
given sport must have on campus enough national-caliber athletes
before a court can find sufficient interest and abilities to exist."31 In
this case, plaintiffs successfully focused the court on the institutional
practices that diminished female participation in sports rather than
any inherent lack of interest by women college students.
Title IX has also been used to successfully challenge the standard
for academic achievement awards.319 New York awarded merit schol-
arships based solely on the Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") scores.
Under this criteria, women received a far lower percentage of the
scholarships than men because they consistently, as a group, scored 10
points lower on the verbal portion of the SAT and at least 40 points
lower on the math portion. 2 ° In this case, the court scrutinized
whether the SAT was an appropriate measure of academic achieve-
ment, challenging the norm itself, rather than accepting as inevitable
that women might perform worse than men. 21
Girls have begun to challenge the widely accepted practice of sex-
ual harassment in the school environment. School districts have re-
sisted Title IX claims concerning sexual harassment, arguing that they
cannot control such conduct.3 22 However, courts are increasingly will-
ing to find that actions such as unwanted touching and sexually sug-
gestive words and motions are no longer an accepted norm of school
315. See Pederson, 213 F.3d at 880.
316. See Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F.Supp. 892, 897 (M.D. La. 1996) (pro-
viding factual background).
317. See id. at 898; see also Pederson, 213 F.3d at 878.
318. See Pederson, 213 F.3d at 878.
319. See Sharif by Salahuddin v. N.Y. St. Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
320. Id. at 355.
321. See id. at 362. In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted the disparate impact
analysis used under the Title VI regulations. See id. at 361-62. See also, infra Part IV.C
(providing an explanation of the disparate impact test used under Title VI).
322. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999).
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behavior but can instead create an unacceptably hostile educational
environment.3 2 The revised guidelines issued by the Department of
Education's Office of Civil Rights reinforce the notion that peer har-
assment can prevent a student from effectively participating in school,
and that schools are responsible for ensuring that sexual harassment
does not so impede students' participation. 324
C. Title VI
Title VI prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from
excluding, denying a benefit, or subjecting anyone to discrimination
on the basis of race, color or national origin.125 The statute charges
each federal agency, which extends federal financial assistance to im-
plement Title VI.26 As a result, the DOE, HHS, and DOJ have each
issued disparate impact regulations. 27
The Title VI regulations promulgated by these three agencies
largely track each other. They provide that:
A recipient, in determining the types of services, financial
aid, or other benefits, or facilities which will be provided
under any such program, or the class of individuals to whom,
or the situations in which, such services, financial aid, other
benefits, or facilities will be provided under any such pro-
gram, or the class of individuals to be afforded an opportu-
nity to participate in any such program, may not, directly or
through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria
or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national
origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing ac-
complishment of the objectives of the program as respect individu-
als of a particular race, color, or national origin.328
The DOJ regulations differ only in their inclusion of "any disposi-
tion" as one of the activities that is covered by the regulations.3 29 The
regulatory language does not specifically discuss whether programs
323. See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. 629.
324. See Department of Education, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Stu-
dents by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/
shguide/index.html (Jan. 2001) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1999).
326. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
327. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.104 (2001); 34 U.S.C. § 100.3 (2001); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b)(2)
(2001).
328. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.104 (b)(2) (emphasis added); 34 U.S.C. § 100.3 (b)(2) (empha-
sis added); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (b) (2) (emphasis added).
329. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.104 (b)(iii-v).
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must be "equally effective." However, language prohibiting recipients
from employing methods of administration that have "the effect of...
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the pro-
gram"33 provides advocates with an opportunity to argue that this re-
quirement can only be met through methods that are equally effective
at aiding individuals in meeting program goals.33'
This regulatory language has devolved into a tripartite test, de-
scribed as a "disparate impact" analysis. This approach, borrowed
from judicial interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,332 requires plaintiffs to make a prima facie case that a facially
neutral practice has a racially disproportionate adverse effect. 33 3 They
must also show a causal link between the challenged practice and the
identified disparate impact.3 34 If plaintiffs are successful in meeting
this standard, defendants must prove that the challenged practice is
substantiated by "educational necessity. ' 335 The challenged course of
action must be "demonstrably necessary to meet an important educa-
tion goal .. 336 Finally, if defendants meet this burden of persua-
sion, 37 plaintiffs must demonstrate that "there exists a comparably
effective alternative practice which would result in less disproportion-
ality," or that the defendant's proffered justification is a pretext for
discrimination. 3
Tide VI has been used to challenge a wide variety of practices by
state and local health and education agencies, largely without suc-
cess.33 ' After a lengthy hiatus in which few Title VI cases were filed
330. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2).
331. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 1999); Elston v.Talladega County Bd.
of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982, n.9 (9th
Cir. 1984) (en banc). The Title VI disparate impact test was first recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and adopted by five Supreme
Court justices for actions under the Title VI regulations in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
332. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1417 (11th Cir. 1985).
333. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407.
334. See id.
335. Id. at 1412; see also Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982.
336. Elston, 997 F.2d at 1412.
337. See id. at 1407, n.14.
338. See id. at 1407.
339. No reported decisions concerning mental health or juvenile justice were found;
however, a few recent cases that have used the Title VI regulations to challenge racial
profiling practices by state police have survived motions to dismiss. See generally Maryland
State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland Dep't of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560
(D. Md. 1999) (refusing to dismiss claims by the Maryland NAACP chapter and individual
motorists representing a class challenging state police stops, detentions and searches as a
violation of the Title VI regulations); Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp.
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outside the context of school segregation, there has been an increase
in judicial decisions under Title VI. Tide VI challenges in the health
context include actions brought against health facilities placement
choices, state regulations permitting discriminatory nursing home
practices, and challenges to a hospital's disclosure to police of results
of cocaine tests of pregnant women." °
The Tide VI regulations have been much more widely used in the
context of education. Plaintiffs have challenged a wide variety of edu-
cational practices at the state level, including school funding;
3 41
school residency requirements; 342 disproportionate representation of
African American students in special education;343 high-stakes test-
ing;.44 and the failure to prevent racial segregation in local school
districts.345 They have also challenged practices of local school dis-
tricts, including facilities location;346 school transfer programs;34 7
placement in special education; 348 and the quality of educational pro-
grams for English language learners. 49
2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim that the state's drug
interdiction efforts disparately impact motorists of color).
340. See, e.g., Linton v. Comm'r of Health and Env't, 779 F. Supp. 925 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (successfully challenging state's limited bed certification policy for Medicaid patients
requiring nursing home care); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
341. SeeRobinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kansas 2000); Campaign for Fiscal
Equity v. New York, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Powell v. Ridge, 247 F.3d 520
(3rd Cir. 2001).
342. See, e.g., Paynter v. New York, 720 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (challenging
combination effect of local residency requirements and state repeal of low income housing
statute).
343. See, e.g., State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th
Cir. 1999); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
344. See, e.g., GI Forum Image de Tejas v. Texas Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.
Tex. 2000).
345. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers, 888 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
346. See, e.g., Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ. 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (lth Cir.
1993); Meyers v. Bd. of Educ. San Juan Sch. Dist., 905 F. Supp. 1544 (D. Utah 1995) (chal-
lenging local school district decision to not locate schools in Navajo Mountain area of the
Navajo reservation).
347. See, e.g., Young v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 922 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Ala.
1996) (challenging policy preventing student athletes who transfer from schools in which
they are in the majority to schools in which they are in the minority to play athletics during
the first year of their attendance at the new school).
348. See, e.g., PASE v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
349. See Flores v. Arizona, 48 F. Supp. 2d 937 (D. Ariz. 1999); Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Calif. 1998); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030 (7th
Cir. 1987) (challenging alleged failure of school districts to evaluate students for English
proficiency and provide bilingual or compensatory education); Teresa P. v. Berkeley Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Calif. 1989) (plaintiffs focused only on proving
discriminatory intent and did not attempt to show a racially discriminatory effect).
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Where plaintiffs have been successful under Title VI, they have
been able to undermine the educational norms asserted by school of-
ficials, norms that make the difficulties facing students appear to lie
within themselves rather than in the state's or schools' educational
practices, and they have been able to argue instead that educational
programs should be equally effective for all students. This tension was
at the forefront in the U.S. Supreme Court's first interpretation of the
Title VI regulations.
In Lau v. Nichols,35° Chinese American students challenged the
practice of the San Francisco School District to give many of them
instruction only in English, thus ignoring their lack of English lan-
guage skills. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had denied the
plaintiffs' claim, reasoning that "[e]very student brings to the starting
line of his educational career different advantages and disadvantages
caused in part by social, economic and cultural background, created
and continued completely apart from any contribution by the school
system." '351 The Superintendent of the School District had placed the
blame for the failure to gain English language skills squarely on the
shoulders of the plaintiffs, stating:
The immigrant family, in settling with its own people, has
limited opportunities for assimilation into the American cul-
ture and language. Often, the immigrant student's only con-
tact with the English language is during class time. After
class, during lunch and recesses, the immigrant child tends
to seek friends among other new arrivals.... In so doing,
there develops a further bond of reinforcing the Chinese
language. Few opportunities are afforded. . . for the student
to speak English once he is back home in Chinatown." 2
The Supreme Court reversed, applying federal regulations under
Title VI that barred criteria or methods that had the effect of discrimi-
nating or limited beneficiaries' ability to accomplish the program's
objectives. 53 The Court found that it was "obvious that the Chinese-
speaking minority receive fewer benefits than the English-speaking
350. See 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
351. Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
352. Id. at 801-02 (Hill, J., dissenting) (quoting Dr. Robert E. Jenkins, CHINESE BILIN-
GUAL EDUCATION: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1968)).
353. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 568-69. The Court also cited clarifying guidelines concerning
the educational rights of English language learners issued by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare in 1970, which stated that a district "must take affirmative steps to
rectify [ ] language [deficiencies] in order to open its instructional program to these stu-
dents," and that the program "must be designed to meet such language skill needs as soon
as possible and must not operate as an educational deadend or permanent track." Id.
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majority .. . which denies them a meaningful opportunity to partici-
pate in the educational program - all earmarks of the discrimination
banned by the regulations." '54
Almost thirty years later, state educational agencies and school
districts continue to make the same argument put forward by the San
Francisco Public Schools in 1973: that student difficulties lie within
themselves, not in the design of educational programs. For example,
minority, non-U.S. origin and disabled students recently challenged
the school funding program maintained by the State of Kansas.155
The students alleged that the school districts that they are most likely
to attend receive less funding per pupil on a statewide basis, and, as a
result, receive fewer educational opportunities than white, U.S. origin
and non-disabled students.356 The State argued that the educational
harms that the plaintiffs alleged were due to "societal ills," not the
school funding practices of the State. 57
A similar, more detailed, argument was made in a school funding
case that went to trial in New York. In that case, the State argued that
the low graduation rates of students in New York City, 84% of whose
students are members of racial or ethnic minorities, were "a product
of various socio-economic deficits experienced by the large number of
at-risk students in the New York City public schools. '3 5' The State ar-
gued that "the crucial determinants of student performance are stu-
dents' socio-economic characteristics, and enhanced resources can do
little to overcome the educational deficits that at-risk children bring to
school." '59 Plaintiffs demonstrated through extensive testimony and
evidence that numerous educational initiatives successfully improve
the educational achievement of at-risk students, and effectively coun-
tered this argument.3 6
°
The same issues have arisen in Title VI disparate impact cases
involving challenges to ability grouping practices and overrepresenta-
tion of minority students in special education. Defendants have ar-
gued that the higher rates of placement of minority students in lower
354. Id.
355. Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kansas 2000).
356. See id. at 1129-30.
357. See id. at 1141.
358. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 517 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001).
359. Id. at 520.
360. See id. at 525-26.
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tracks of ability grouping and special education programs are the re-
sult of other factors, such as "family background" and "hard work." ''
Defendants do not explicitly argue that African American stu-
dents cannot learn. However, by advocating in Title VI cases that the
students' socio-economic background, rather than the approach used
by states and schools in administering their educational programs,
state and local education agencies reinforce the effects of institutional
racism. In addition, the agencies appeal to the unconscious racist be-
lief that African American and other students of color cannot be suc-
cessfully taught, that they are inferior students.
Thus, those who challenge forms of structural racial discrimina-
tion must be prepared to demonstrate that racial and ethnic minority
students suffer disproportionately from negative educational out-
comes not because of demographic factors, but because of institu-
tional practices that disadvantage them. Plaintiffs must openly
challenge the unstated racial norm that only white, middle-class stu-
dents are "ready to learn," prove forcefully that all students are ready
to learn, and demonstrate that institutional and unconscious racial
discrimination in state and local practices systematically disadvantages
racial and ethnic minority students.362 In this manner, litigants can
challenge the unstated racial norms, just as litigants under Title IX
and Section 504 have challenged the gender and (dis)ability norms.
Title VI disparate impact litigants have largely ignored uncon-
scious racial discrimination in making their claims. While the litigants
in some cases have argued that reduced teacher expectations for mi-
nority student achievement or an insufficiently multicultural educa-
tional approach was a vestige of past segregation,363 litigants under
Title VI do not seem to have attempted to provide evidence on these
or other possible facets of unconscious racial discrimination.
Plaintiffs should not limit their claims to the effect of structural
racial inequities. Rather, they should focus on proving the combined
effects of institutional and unconscious racial discrimination. For ex-
ample, in a case alleging a Title VI violation relating to the dispropor-
tionate representation of African American boys in suspensions and
expulsions, plaintiffs should focus not just on the statistical disparities
in suspension and expulsion, but on the greater likelihood that the
schools which have high percentages of African American boys are
under funded, concentrate students with high levels of poverty, have
361. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1419 (11th Cir. 1985).
362. Harry & Anderson, Social Construction, supra note 57, at 46-50.
363. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers, 197 F.2d 41, 51-54 (2d Cir. 1999).
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fewer teachers who are certified, experienced, or have obtained mas-
ters or doctoral degrees, exhibit poor school governance, and have
fewer facilities and programs, particularly in areas that give students
positive feelings about their schools, such as athletics, arts and music
programs.3 64 In addition, evidence should focus on the teacher-stu-
dent interactions that, over time, lead to a referral for discipline.365
Only by revealing the complex workings of institutional and uncon-
scious racism can advocates challenge courts to force schools and
other institutions that serve children to ensure that their services are
equally effective for all, not just some, of their participants.
GI Forum v. Texas Education Agency36 6 demonstrates the difficulties
facing plaintiffs in Title VI cases. In that case, plaintiffs challenged
the adoption of a graduation test, one that strongly disparately and
negatively affected minority students. 67 While the court acknowl-
edged that plaintiffs had shown that minority students in Texas "have
been, and to some extent continue to be, the victims of educational
inequality,"36 the court refused to link these general claims of ine-
quality with unequal access to learning the items presented on the
graduation test.3 69 Clearly, the standard of proof will be very high on
litigants claiming the effects of structural and unconscious racism, and
their proofs need to be constructed to meet the most skeptical of
minds. In an effort to hold education, mental health and juvenile
justice programs accountable for equal effectiveness, plaintiffs need to
carefully construct the relationship between institutional practices
and the negative effects on African American boys. 70
The complex workings of institutional and unconscious racism
can also be the subjects of complaints to federal agencies, such as
DOE, DOJ and HHS, that are charged with implementing Title VI
364. Linda Darling-Hammond, Creating Standards of Practice and Delivery for Learner-Cen-
tered Schools, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37 (1992/1993) (noting the importance of evaluating
the resources organizational approaches and teaching practices that are needed to provide
all students with an equal opportunity for success).
365. SKIBA ET AL., supra note 83, at 15-18; Beth Harry et al., Of Rocks and Soft Places: Using
Qualitative Methods to Investigate the Processes that Result in Disproportionality, in MINOITY Is-
SUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, (forthcoming).
366. GI Forum Image De Tejas v. Texas Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Texas
2000).
367. See id. at 673. The court noted that the racial and ethnic disparities in the test
passage rates cut across socio-economic lines. See id. at 679.
368. Id. at 674.
369. See id.
370. See Paul Weckstein, School Reform and Enforceable Rights to Quality Education, in LAw
AND SCHOOL REFORM (Jay Heubert ed. 1999) (providing an excellent discussion on how to
develop a broad-based approach to improving education for all students).
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regulations in federally funded programs under their jurisdiction. 71
Because these agencies have their own investigators and are able to
negotiate resolutions to alleviate racial disparities in their programs,
they may be able to obtain stronger remedies in a shorter timeframe
than private litigants can through court action. 7 2
The measures suggested here are far from easy, and these proofs
and arguments will be made to very skeptical audiences. However,
litigation provides the opportunity to create essential narratives of ra-
cial inequality, and success in cases such as Campaign for Fiscal Equity v.
New York can reverberate to the benefit of students of color around
the country. These cases also point to the urgent need for advocates
to act to protect access to the courts by private litigants seeking to
enforce the Title VI disparate impact regulations.
V. REQUIRING STATES TO MONITOR AND CORRECT
RACIAL DISPARITIES
The severely disproportionate treatment of African American
children, and specifically African American boys, has not completely
escaped Congressional notice. In a few instances, Congress has made
findings about these disproportions and required agencies and recipi-
ents of federal funds to take explicit actions to alleviate these dispro-
portions. While it is not clear whether failure to comply with these
provisions is actionable, these statutory provisions create opportuni-
ties to advocate for the collection of adequate data on racial, ethnic
and gender disparities and to ensure that states follow through on
programmatic changes to alleviate found disparities. In addition, they
may provide models for legislative advocacy to include specific evalua-
tion and reform efforts in other areas, such as mental health, that
show serious disproportionalities in treatment.
The two most useful provisions involve the IDEA and the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), which not only re-
quire states to collect data by race, but also require states to take af-
firmative steps to reduce the disproportionate representation of
minority youth in special education and residential juvenile facili-
371. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (2000) (concerning the filing of complaints, investigations
and resolution of complaints).
372. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY PROJECT
SERIES, VOL. I, at 205-19 (1996) (providing a description of OCR's complaint review
process).
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ties.3 73 A few other statutes require the collection of information that
can be used in political advocacy and to make claims under Title VI.
In 1997, during the reauthorization of the IDEA, Congress found
that minority students were disproportionately represented in special
education. 7 4 Congress found that "[g]reater efforts are needed to
prevent the intensification of problems connected with mislabeling
and high dropout rates among minority children with disabilities.
375
The 1997 amendments require states to monitor school districts for
potential discrimination in suspensions and expulsions of children
with disabilities; establish performance goals, using indicators such as
performance on assessments, dropout rates, and high school comple-
tion; when the state's indicators point to ineffective progress for stu-
dents with disabilities, the state must adjust its improvement plan
accordingly; intervene by revising policies, procedures and practices,
where significant racial disproportionality exists in special education
identification and placement.3
7 6
A similar provision in the JJDPA goes even further by reducing
federal funding to states that fail to demonstrate that they have made
efforts to reduce or eliminate racial disparities in juvenile confine-
ment. Since 1974, Congress has authorized federal financial assis-
tance to help states in preventing juvenile crime, to rehabilitate
juveniles found to be delinquent, and to improve the quality of the
administration of juvenile justice. 77 These "Formula Grant" funds
are allocated among the various states on the basis of the relative pop-
ulation of people under age eighteen.3 78 In 1988, Congress identified
the disproportionate confinement of juveniles from minority groups
as a serious problem, and Congress amended the JJDPA to require
states participating in the JJDPA Formula Grant Program to
address efforts to reduce the proportion of juveniles de-
tained or confined in secure detention facilities, secure cor-
rectional facilities, jails, and lockups who are members of
minority groups if such proportion exceeds the proportion
such groups represent in the general population.3
373. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5786
(1994). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5 667(c) (1994).
374. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997; Pub. L. No.
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).
375. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (8) (A) (1994).
376. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.755 (2000).
377. See 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1994).
378. See id. § 5632(a)(1).
379. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 § 7258 (1988)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (1994).
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In 1992, Congress further amended the JJDPA to make efforts to
reduce racial and ethnic disproportion in confinement a "core re-
quirement."38 That is, any state that fails to make the required efforts
to reduce disproportionate confinement would receive a 25% reduc-
tion in their next annual formula grant and would become ineligible
to receive any further funds under the program if they do not make a
financial and substantive commitment to complying with the provi-
sion. 81 In some cases, private litigants have been permitted to sue
under § 1983 to enforce required provisions of the JJDPA. 8 2
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) issued regulations under this section. These regulations re-
quire that applications for Formula Grant funds include information
that demonstrates that states have made "specific efforts to reduce the
proportion of juveniles detained or confined" in secure facilities.383
States must provide detailed data on minority confinement rates, a
complete assessment of disproportionate minority confinement, and
specify a time-limited plan of action to reduce the disproportion. 84
The OjjDP maintains an active website that makes available re-
search on the issue of disproportionate confinement.385 The Office
also provides a catalog for every state's research reports on the issue,
including the reports from five federally funded pilot programs.386
A few other statutes require states to collect helpful information
concerning racial and ethnic groups. For example, Title I of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act ("Title I") provides states and
local school districts federal funds targeted to the educational needs
of economically disadvantaged students. 3 18  During the 1994
reauthorization of Title I, Congress added a requirement that states
conduct yearly assessments of student achievement, and mandated
380. See An Act to Amend the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,
Pub. L. 102-586, 106 Stat. 4982 § 2(f) (3) (A) (ii) (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(c) (3)
(1994)).
381. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(c) (3) (A).
382. See Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir. 1994);James v.
Jones, 148 F.R.D. 196, 199-200 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
383. 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(j) (2000).
384. See id.
385. See, e.g., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, MINORITIES IN
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1999 NATIONAL REPORT SERIES, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN
(1999); Carl E. Pope & William Feyerherm, Minorities and the Juvenile Justice System: Research
Summary http://www.ojjdp.hcjrs.org/dmc/tools/index.html (1995) (on file with the Jour-
nal of Health Care Law and Policy).
386. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, CATALOG OF STATE RE-
SEARCH REPORTS ON DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT, available at http://
www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/dmc/tools/index.html (last modified July 2, 2001).
387. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000).
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that states report the results of those yearly assessments, disaggregated
by race, ethnicity, gender, English proficiency status, migrant status,
disability status, and socioeconomic status of the students who took
the assessments. 381 When Title I was reauthorized in 2001, these re-
quirements were strengthened, requiring that states demonstrate ade-
quate yearly progress in enabling all students to meet academic
achievement standards, and that they demonstrate this progress for
specific groups of students, including students who are economically
disadvantaged, students from each major racial and ethnic group, and
students with disabilities.3 s9
Recently, Congress established the National Center on Minority
Health and Health Disparities. 39 ' The Center is charged with coordi-
nating and supporting an interdisciplinary health research agenda to
address the health needs of racial and ethnic minorities.3 ' While the
statute establishing the Center does not require the same degree of
action required under the IDEA and the JJDPA, these and other provi-
sions provide opportunities for advocates to ensure that the disparities
that negatively affect African American boys and other racial and eth-
nic minority children receive priority attention.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Nation has tolerated a shockingly high level of disparate
treatment of racial and ethnic minorities. As this article clearly shows,
African American boys have been excessively subjected to practices in
our public education, mental health and juvenile justice systems that
label, discipline, segregate, punish and confine them.392 When Afri-
can American boys enter our schools, mental health and juvenile jus-
tice programs, the programs they receive should be equally effective
and designed to enable them to achieve the academic success, good
mental health and rehabilitation that are the goals of those pro-
grams.393 In order to accomplish this goal, advocates should argue for
a strong interpretation of the Title VI disparate impact regulations to
clearly attack the unstated racial norms of these institutions and the
accompanying structural and unconscious racial discrimination that
388. The Improving America's Schools Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518,
§ 1111 (b) (3) (I) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(I) (2000)).
389. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425,
§ lIII(b)(2) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2) (2000)).
390. See Minority Health and Health Disparities Research and Education Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-525, 114 Stat. 2495 § 101 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 287c-31 (1994)).
391. See 42 U.S.C. § 287c-31 (a).
392. See supra, Part II.
393. See supra, Part IV.
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so impede African American boys. At a time when access to the courts
to enforce the Title VI disparate impact regulations is under siege,
advocates must act forcefully to protect that access and to utilize the
regulations to their fullest in the service of racial equality.
